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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,

:
:

v.

:

DANNY HITTLE,

:

Defendant/Respondent.

Case No. 20020504-SC

Ct. App. No. 2000712-CA

:

BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON CERTIORARI REVIEW
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Court granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari to review the court of
appeals' decision in State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App. 134,47 P.3d 101 (a copy of the court
of appeals' decision is attached in Addendum A). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW1
1. Did the court of appeals err in finding obvious error where the trial court
omitted a single word—"speedy"—from the plea colloquy when informing defendant of
his right to an impartial jury trial?
2. Did the court of appeals err in presuming prejudice where defendant's claim of
a rule 11 violation was before the court under the plain error doctrine and defendant had
failed to assert the requisite prejudice?
"On certiorari review 'we review the court of appeals' decision, not the opinion of
the [trial] court.' State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, f 10, 458 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. That decision
is then reviewed for correctness. Id" State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, \ 7,
Adv. Rep.

Utah

; State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 16, 57 P.3d 1052.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is relevant to the issues on appeal and
is attached in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two counts of criminal non-support: a third degree
felony and a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (Supp.

!

The State mistakenly failed to include within the scope of the direct appeal the
question of the court of appeals' jurisdiction to review a challenge to the taking of a plea
where the particular challenge was not first presented to the trial court in a motion to
withdraw the plea. However, the issue is currently under certiorari review by this Court
in State v. Wallace Dean, Case No. 20020952-SC.
2

1998) (R. 44-46). State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, f 2, 47 P.3d 101. Add. A. On April
20, 1000, he entered a guilty plea to the misdemeanor charge pursuant to a plea bargain
under which the State sought dismissal of the felony charge and agreed to a repayment
schedule (R. 139:1-2). Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, f 2. Add. A. The trial court provided
the following information to defendant pursuant to rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure:
Do you understand that by entering this plea today . . . you are giving up
your right to go to trial; [your] right to confront and cross examine
witnesses, to present evidence on your behalf or to refrain from presenting
evidence if you[] wish and to make the State carry the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements of the offense as charged; to
have witnesses brought on your behalf to court to testify, with the
compulsion of a subpoena if necessary. You have the right not to commit
yourself unless you choose to take the stand in which case you would be
subject to cross examination. You have the right to, if you were to be
convicted and found guilty following a trial by an impartial decision maker,
or a jury in this matter, you would have the right to appeal. You're giving
up those rights by entering this plea today.
Hittle. 2002 UT App. 134,1f 2. Add. A.
At the time he entered his plea, defendant executed a written statement that he
understood the rights he was waiving. That statement was quoted from and incorporated
into the record at the change of plea hearing (R. 139:21-22) (the transcript is attached in
Addendum C). Defendant waived the time for sentencing, and the court sentenced him
according to the parties' agreement: a term of 365 days in jail, suspended, and a specific
payment schedule including on-going child support, arrearage child support, and attorney

3

fees (R. 58; R. 139:22-28). In addition, defendant was to seek full-time employment and
take anger management classes through Valley Mental Health (id.).
Defendant timely sought to withdraw the plea, arguing only that his trial counsel
pressured him into taking the plea and citing an altercation which occurred in court
following acceptance of the plea (R. 62-64; R. 140:1-3).2 The trial court denied the
motion (R. 110: R. 140:l-3).3 Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, f 3. Add. A. Defendant timely
appealed that denial, but abandoned the only claim he had made to the trial court and
pursued several new claims (R. 116-17).
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case, finding that the trial court
committed plain error by failing to mention the word "speedy" when telling defendant
that his plea would forfeit his right to a trial by an impartial jury. Hittle, 2002 UT App
134, ^ 6. Add. A. That decision included a presumption that the omission was prejudicial
to defendant and that, but for that omission, he would not have pled guilty. Id. atfflf9-10.
Add. A. By order dated October 23, 2002, this Court granted the State's petition for
certiorari to consider the court of appeals' decision.

2

The trial court briefly mentioned the incident in denying the motion, but no
transcript of the incident itself appears in the appellate record (R. 140:1-3).
3

A year later, on April 20, 2001, the trial court found that defendant had violated
numerous terms and conditions of his probation, revoked probation and reinstated the
original sentence of jail confinement (R. 194-96).
4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Under a validly-entered divorce decree, defendant was required to pay S275.00 per
month child support for his daughter, who was born on December 30, 1990 (R. 45-46; R.
139:12).4 Between February 1, 1997, and April 5, 2000, defendant was chronically
delinquent in payment of his child support, and his total arrearage at the time of
sentencing was in excess of $10,000.00 (R. 45).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
POINT I: The court of appeals' opinion is incorrect because it requires the trial
court to give a rote recitation of the rule 11 requirements before strict compliance can be
had. This is contrary to this Court's precedent providing that the trial court may employ
"multiple means" to insure the voluntariness of a plea. It also ignores this Court's
precedent implicitly holding that the rule 11 standard is met when a defendant is advised
of his right to a trial by jury, even absent mention of the word "speedy."
In this case, the rule 11 requirements were met by the trial court's painstaking
review of defendant's rights and subsequent review of the colloquy tapes and
reaffirmation of his belief that defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary. The
omission of the word "speedy" did not defeat the substantive goal of the rule. Moreover,
any error in omission of the word "speedy" was not obvious because the decision upon

4

The facts are taken from the prosecutor's recitation at the change of plea hearing
and the amended information (R. 44-46; R. 139:12).
5

which the court of appeals based their ruling had not issued at the time the plea was taken
in this case.
POINT II: The court of appeals erred in presuming prejudice when faced with an
alleged rule 11 violation raised on appeal pursuant to the plain error doctrine. This error
was compounded in this case because defendant failed to argue, let alone prove, any
prejudice, as is required by the plain error doctrine. The court of appeals' position is
contrary not only to rulings from this Court, but parallel rulings from the United States
Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals when faced with the same issue
involving the federal rule. Defendant's failure to include this claim in his motion to
withdraw his plea in the trial court suggests that he was not prejudiced by it.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DISREGARDS THIS
COURT'S PRECEDENT HOLDING THAT ROTE RECITATION IS
NOT REQUIRED IN ORDER TO MEET THE RULE 11(E)
REQUIREMENTS
The court of appeals determined that the "trial court did not strictly comply with
rule 11 because it failed to advise Defendant of his right to a speedy trial either orally or
in the plea affidavit." State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ^ 6, 47 P.3d 101 (emphasis
added). Add. A. Relying on its own precedent in State v. Tarnaxviecki, 2000 UT App
186, f 18, 5 P.3d 1222, the court of appeals concluded that strict compliance required the
trial court to detail that the right waived was the right to a speedy trial. Hittle, 2002 UT

6

App. 134, <[ 6. Add. A. The court made no attempt to review any other contact between
the trial court and defendant or any other part of the record that may well have impacted
on the issue.
The court of appeals' opinion is incorrect because it essentially requires a rote
recitation of all the rule 11 requirements in the colloquy and the affidavit before it will
find that a court has strictly complied with rule 11. This limited review is contrary to this
Court's precedent holding that the trial court may employ "multiple means" to insure the
voluntariness of a plea. See State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991). Moreover,
the court of appeals holding disregards this Court's precedent which implicitly holds that
the rule 11 standard is met where a defendant is advised of his right to a trial by jury, even
absent mention of the word "speedy". See State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 203.
A*

Rote Recitation At The Plea Hearing Is Contrary To This Court's
Determination That Strict Compliance May Be Demonstrated By "Multiple
Means"
In finding that there was no strict compliance with rule 11, the court of appeals

merely looked at the oral colloquy and the plea affidavit and assessed that the word
"speedy" was missing. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, at f 6. Add. A. This is not the review
established by this Court for a claimed rule 11 violation.
This Court has placed the responsibility for establishing strict compliance with all
constitutional and rule 11(e) requirements squarely on the trial court. State v. Gibbons,
740 P.2d 1309, 1311,1313 (Utah 1987). Prior to accepting a guilty plea, "'the trial court
[must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary
7

and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional
rights.'" State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11, 22 P.3d 1242 (quoting State v. Abeyta, 852
P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993)) (emphasis in original). This Court has "described this duty as
one o f strict' compliance." Id. (quoting State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah
1996)). "Strict compliance, however, does not mandate a particular script or rote
recitation of the rights listed." Id. (citing Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 996; Maguire, 830 P.2d at
218). On the contrary, "the substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know
of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead
guilty. That goal should not be overshadowed or undermined by formalistic ritual." Id.
See also United State v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, _ , 122 S. Ct. 1043, 1052 (2002) (stressing
that ceremony not be valued over substance in the taking of pleas under rule 11, Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure) (citing Advisory Committee's Notes on 1983 Amendments
to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11,18 U.S.C. App., p. 1568).
Consequently, to ensure that the defendant fully understands the nature of his act,
the trial court may employ "multiple means so long as no requirement of the rule is
omitted and so long as the record reflects that the [strict compliance] requirement has
been fulfilled." Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217; see also Visser, 2000 UT 88,ffl[12, 13. This
includes not only a written affidavit of the defendant which is properly incorporated into
the record during the plea colloquy, but "'the contents of other documents such as the
information, presentence reports, exhibits, etc.'" Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 12 (quoting
Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218); see also State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28,fflf17, 18, 996 P.2d
8

1065, affd 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528. The methodology for ensuring compliance with
rule 11 is thus not based on the trial court's talismanic recitation of an enumerated list of
rights. There is no rote script that every trial court must necessarily follow to fulfill the
letter of the law. Accordingly, although strict compliance is ultimately a matter of law, it
will turn on the facts of each case. Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217 (citing State v. Hoff, 814
P.2dlll9, 1125 (Utah 1991)).
In this case, the panel made no attempt to review or even to acknowledge the
relevance of any other record factors which may have had a bearing on the substantive
goal of rule 11—"to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand
the basic consequence of their decision to plead guilty." Visser, 2000 UT 88,fflf11, 12,
17 (affirming use of defendant's "direct experience relative to his right to a speedy trial
before an impartial jury" and the trial court's explanation of the continuing nature of the
right). In so doing, it ignored the true focus of the inquiry in this type of
case—defendant's knowledge and understanding—in favor of an oversimplified
ritualistic recitation of rights. In this case, the trial judge did not mechanically advance
the word "speedy." However, he not only took extreme care in making his determination
that defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary, but he reviewed the colloquy tapes in
considering defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, and he reaffirmed that
determination, noting that he took great care in the colloquy with defendant and that
defendant made it "entirely clear" that "he felt that this [plea] was a rational alternative,
that he was entering into of his own free will" (R. 140: 3). See subpoint IB, infra.
9

The court of appeals based their opinion in this case on their own decision in
Tarnawiecki, which in turn relied on State v. Visser (Visser I), 1999 UT App 19, 973 P.2d
998, reversed by this Court in State v. Visser {Visser II), 2002 UT 88, 22 P.3d 1242. In
overruling Visser I, this Court held that "[s]trict compliance . .. does not mandate a
particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed" in rule 11(e). Visser II, 2002 UT 88,
f 11. Because the court of appeals' decision contravenes this Court's well-established
body of law governing guilty pleas by requiring rote recitation of the rule 11(e) rights
regardless of the substance of the colloquy and the remainder of the record, this Court
should correct the court of appeals' analysis.
&

Rule 11 May Be Met Where Defendant Is Advised Of His Right To A Trial Bv
Jury. Even Absent Use Of The Word "Speedy"
The analysis in this case is inconsistent with this Court's decision in State v.

Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 203, which impliedly held that the rule 11 standard is met
where a defendant is advised of his right to a trial by jury, even absent mention of the
word "speedy." In Martinez, the defendant moved in the district court to withdraw his
guilty plea, claiming it was not knowing and voluntary. Id. at % 11. The district court
denied the motion, and Martinez appealed. Id. at f 13. On appeal, this Court held that the
district court had "strictly complied with the constitutional and procedural requirements
for entry of [Martinez's] guilty plea," including the mandates of rule 11. Id. at f 26. This
Court reasoned that "strict compliance with rule 11(e) creates a presumption that the plea
was voluntary" and affirmed. Id. at ^| 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

10

In so doing, the court opined that "the strict compliance requirement does not mandate a
particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed. The purpose of rule 11 is to ensure
that a defendant knows of his or her rights and thereby understands the consequences of a
decision to plead guilty." Id. at ^ 22. The opinion observed, by way of background, that
defendant understood his rights, among them, "the right to a jury trial and that the matter
was set for trial." Id. at ^f 4. In its analysis of defendant's rule 11 challenge, this Court
again enumerated the rights that defendant acknowledged and understood, among them,
"the right to a jury trial." Id. at f 23. Although nothing in the case suggested that the trial
court had used the terms impartial and speedy, this Court nonetheless held that the
colloquy "strictly complied" with rule 11. Id. at f 26. By implication, therefore,
Martinez overrules the court of appeals' inconsistent decision in this case, as there is no
dispute concerning the fact that the trial court advised defendant that by pleading guilty
he waived his right to a jury trial.
Moreover, the record makes it clear that the trial court did not ignore the mandates
of rule 11(e). Defendant's rights were laid out in detail in the statement he made in
connection with his plea and in his colloquy with the court (R. 56-57). The trial court
informed defendant of all of his rule 11 rights, including his right to a jury trial, and that
his entry of a guilty plea would waive those rights (R. 139: 1-29). Add. C. The trial court
also instructed defendant that the State must prove every element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt and that trial would be by an impartial jury (R. 139: 4-5). The trial
judge gave defendant complete freedom to articulate his position relative to the plea, then
11

carefully and pointedly made a determination of voluntariness and knowledge (R. 139: 322).
Thereafter, the trial court reviewed the tape of the change of plea hearing in
conjunction with defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, having a second opportunity to
review his initial determination that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered (R.
140: 1, 3). The judge explained that he went to "great length" during the colloquy and his
discussion with defendant so that it would be "entirely clear that [defendant] was not
being shoe horned into this, that he did not have to take that plea[,].. .[t]hat he could go
to trial on the matter" (R. 140: 3). Defendant made it clear to the judge that "he felt that
this [plea] was a rational alternative, that he was entering into of his own free will" (id.).
The court's painstaking enumeration and later review of defendant's rights, as well
as the court's confirmed belief, after review of the colloquy, that defendant's plea was
knowing and voluntary, sufficed to meet the requirements of rule 11(e)(3). The trial
court's procedure was sufficient to ensure that defendant knew of his rights and
understood the consequences of his decision to plead guilty. The trial court's omission of
the word "speedy" did not defeat the substantive goal of rule 11: to ensure that defendant
knew of his rights and thereby understood the basic consequences of his decision to plead
guilty. See Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11.

12

C.

On This Record. Anv Error In The Absence Of The Word "Speedv" Was Not
Obvious
Moreover, any error on the part of the trial court could not have been deemed

obvious because the trial court did not have the benefit of the ruling in Tarnawiecki at the
time it took the plea in this case—Tarnawiecki would not be issued until two months
later. The trial court therefore ignored no settled appellate law when it failed to use the
word "speedy. Any failure of the trial court to follow a case which has not yet been
published cannot be deemed obvious error. See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah
App. 1997) (error is not obvious under the plain error doctrine "where there is no settled
appellate law to guide the trial court.").
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS' PRESUMPTION OF ERROR UNDER
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HAS NO BASIS IN THIS COURT'S
RULE 11 PRECEDENT AND RUNS CONTRARY TO THE PLAIN
ERROR DOCTRINE
The court of appeals did not require that defendant make any allegation or showing
of prejudice under the plain error doctrine. Despite the absence of any claim of prejudice
on appeal, the court of appeals sua sponte presumed prejudice simply "because the
omission dealt with a substantial constitutional right." Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, <[ 9.
Add. A. Citing its own case law which used the same presumption, the court of appeals
assumed that omission of a right meant defendant did not know of the right, and "by not
knowing which rights a defendant is waiving, the defendant cannot make a fully informed
decision." Id. at ^ 10. Add. A. This decision has no basis in rule 11 precedent from this
13

Court, and is contrary to this Court's interpretation of the plain error doctrine and to
federal precedent appropriately allocating the burden of proof to defendant under a plain
error claim raised in conjunction with a claimed federal rule 11 violation.
This Court has held that appellate courts may review unpreserved error only where
it is plain, i.e., where (i) error exists, (ii) error is obvious, and (iii) error is harmful. State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). The court of appeals determined that the tnal
court's failure to explain that defendant waived his right to a speedy trial constituted plain
error, despite any showing of obviousness or harm. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ^ 9. Add.
A. In so doing, the majority rendered a decision inconsistent with this Court's decision in
Dunn. While noncompliance with rule 11 may establish error and, in some cases, even
obvious error, it does not necessarily establish prejudice. See Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App
186, f 15 ("[I]t is difficult to see how the court's failure in this case to discuss the
possibility that defendant may serve no time and incur no fine [as required by rule
11(e)(5)] would result in a harmful error").
Plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel share a "common standard" of
prejudice. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, n.14, 12 P.3d 92 (citing State v. Verde, 770
P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989). A defendant claiming that his guilty plea resulted from
counsel's ineffectiveness must show "'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'"
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59
(1985)), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994). Thus, a defendant attempting to show plain
14

error under rule 11 must demonstrate that but for the trial court's omissions, he would not
have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial."
In other words, where a defendant claims plain error in the taking of his plea, the
test for prejudice is driven not by the requirements of rule 11, but by traditional plain
error analysis.6
Further, the court of appeals' decision inexplicably departs from established case
law placing on defendant the burden of establishing prejudice before being entitled to
prevail under the plain error doctrine. Under this Court's precedent, the claim should
have been rejected for defendant's failure to meet that burden. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1209 (the absence of any one of the three elements of the plain error doctrine defeats the
claim); see also State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App.) (holding defendant's
"brief, conclusory statement" insufficient to establish the prejudice required under the
plain error doctrine), cert, denied, 923 P.2d 693 (1996).

5

Otherwise stated, defendant must establish that an obvious error so infected the
plea-taking that the appellate court no longer has confidence in its underlying validity,
because the plea was less than knowing and voluntary. Cf. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09;
also Visser, 2000 UT 88, H 11-14.
6

The court of appeals strayed from this analysis in Tarnawiecki by presuming
prejudice, i.e., that failure to advise Tarnawiecki of her right to a speedy trial before an
impartial jury "is prejudicial and therefore harmful." Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, ^j
18. Tarnawiecki should have been required to demonstrate that, but for the trial court's
violations of rule 11, she would not have pled guilty. Otherwise, omission of the words
"speedy" and "impartial," like the failure to advise Tarnawiecki of her minimum possible
sentence as required by rule 11(e)(5), would have been harmless.
15

Both the United States Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have rejected the
court of appeals presumption in rule 11 cases raised pursuant to the plain error doctrine.
Rule 11 's federal counterpart includes a subsection (h) entitled "Harmless Error." Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(h). That subsection provides, "Any variance from the procedures required by
this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." This provision
"rejects the extreme sanction of automatic reversal." Advisory Committee Note (1983
amendment). Thus, a rule 11 violation "warrants reversal only if it had a significant
influence on appellant's decision to plead guilty." United States v. Vaughn, 7 F.3d 1533,
1535 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702, 704 (10th Cir.), cert,
denied, 496 U.S. 939 (1990)), cert denied, 511 U.S. 1036 (1994). Otherwise stated, the
reviewing court will "'examine the facts and circumstances of the . . . case to see if the
district court's flawed compliance with . . . Rule 1 1 . . . may reasonably be viewed as
having been a material factor affecting [defendant's decision to plead guilty.'" United
States v. Gigot, 147 F.3d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Johnson,
1 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (in turn quoting United States v. Bachynsky,
934 F.2d 1349, 1360 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 502 U.S. 951 (1991)).
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed itself to this situation,
rejecting the presumption of error in rule 11 cases raised on appeal pursuant to the plain
error doctrine. In United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 122 S. Ct. 1043 (2002), defendant
pled guilty to armed bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and carrying a
firearm during a crime of violence. Id., 122 S. Ct. at 1047-48 (in Addendum D).
16

Defendant claimed for the first time on appeal that the trial court violated rule 11 by
failing to advise him of his right to counsel at trial. Id. at 1047-48. Add. D. He argued
that he had no appellate burden under the plain error rule to show prejudice, but that the
State had the responsibility to establish harmlessness. Id. at 1050. Add. D.
The Court rejected defendant's argument, holding that a silent defendant carries
the burden on appeal of affirmatively establishing some prejudice or detriment to the legal
system before benefitting from his silence at the plea hearing. Id, at 1046. Add. D. In so
doing, the Court recognized that rule 11 provides procedural safeguards which serve
important constitutional interests in guarding against inadvertent and ignorant waivers of
constitutional rights. Id, at 1050-51. Add. D. The Court also noted that not all
requirements under the rule are of equal importance relative to "the overarching issues of
knowledge and voluntariness^]" Id. at 1052. Add. D. The Court pointed to the rules
governing entry and withdrawal of pleas, with their emphasis on addressing plea-related
mistakes where those mistakes can be corrected easily and on promoting finality "in a
system as heavily dependent on guilty pleas as ours." Id, at 1053-54. Add. D. The Court
found that relieving defendant of having to establish prejudice under the plain error
doctrine on appeal would undermine these laudable goals by permitting the defendant to
"choose to say nothing about a judge's plain lapse under Rule 11 until the moment of
taking a direct appeal, at which time the burden would always fall on the Government to
prove harmlessness." Id. at 1053. Add. D.

17

Not only does the court of appeals' ruling in this case achieve that same
undesirable result, but it does so without any recognition of or attempt to distinguish the
United States Supreme Court's analysis which the State put before the panel.
Our rule 11 contains no harmless error provision equivalent to the federal rule, but
our plain error analysis does. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Consequently, the analysis
used by the United States Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit is a useful guide to the
application of harmless error analysis in the rule 11 context. To show that a rule 11
violation was harmful, a defendant must demonstrate that the errors significantly
influenced or materially affected his decision to plead guilty. This is another way of
saying that, but for the errors, he would not have pled guilty.
Defendant has not demonstrated that, but for the trial court's failure to advise him
that the right to trial was the right to a speedy trial, he would not have pled guilty. In fact,
his written arguments before the court of appeals are entirely devoid of any explanation of
prejudice. See Amended Opening Br. of Aplt. on Appeal, at 7-11. Not only did
defendant demonstrate no harm, but he made no claim in his written arguments in this
appeal that he did not know about the speedy trial right.7 He argued only that the trial

7

In his opposition to the State's petition for writ of certiorari, defendant attempts to
distinguish Vonn, and concludes the paragraph with the bald assertion that he was not
"informed of the right the trial court omitted." Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 7. This is not a claim that he did not know of the right, only that the record did not
show that he was informed of the right at another time by the trial court, inasmuch as that
is the basis upon which he distinguishes Vonn in that paragraph. See id. at 6-7.
18

court's failure to mention it was "harmful as a violation of the very reason Rule 11 was
adopted" (Amended Opening Br. of Aplt. on Appeal, at 11).8
Nothing in the record suggests that defendant pled guilty because he feared that his
trial would not be speedy. Even the trial court did not see this as one of defendant's
concerns. When faced with defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, the trial judge
reviewed the colloquy tapes to determine whether he was satisfied that defendant's plea
was entered into knowingly and voluntarily (R. 140: 3). He then explained that
I went through this motion with (inaudible) discussion and plea colloquy
with Mr. Hittle at great length because he was so clearly reluctant and I
wanted to make entirely clear that he was not being shoe horned into this,
that he did not have to take that plea. That he could go to trial on the matter
and he made it very clear to me that while he didn't like it, he felt that this
was a rationale alternative, that he was entering into of his own free will,
and that's the basis why I denied the motion to dismiss, I mean the motion
to withdraw.
(R. 140: 3). Even upon a second review, the trial court was satisfied that he had
addressed defendant's concerns and that defendant was acting knowingly and voluntarily.
Clearly nothing in the trial court's interaction with defendant suggested that the
speediness of any trial was of any concern.
Finally, the fact remains that if defendant had raised the issue in the trial court, the
court could have corrected any problem or clarified the record. It is because defendant

8

Curiously, defendant acknowledged the importance of the prejudice requirement
in his response to the State's cert petition. He notes that "the only credible issue on
appeal was did the trial court's error [in omitting the word "speedy"] prejudice Mr.
Hittle." Response to Petition for Certiorari at 7, n.2.
19

remained silent that the record is devoid of any evidence as to why he decided to plead
guilty or how the absence of the word "speedy" from the colloquy did or did not
materially affect his decision to plead guilty. The record in fact shows that defendant did
not believe the omission significant enough to even mention it in his motion to withdraw
the guilty plea filed in the trial court. The trial court's ruling presents defendant with an
unwarranted windfall and continues the bad precedent set by court of appeals cases that
encourage defendants to intentionally sit silently through the trial court in the face of any
error in entering a plea pursuant to rule 11, decide thereafter to get out of the plea, raise a
plain error claim on appeal no matter how irrelevant the claimed error may have been to
his plea decision, and escape his plea through his manipulation of the system.
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals' failure to properly review defendant's rule 11 claim and
inappropriate presumption of the prejudice requirement of the plain error doctrine is
contrary to this Court's precedent and injects confusion into the taking and reviewing of
guilty pleas. The ruling amounts to a requirement of rote recitation of the rule 11 factors,
contrary to this Court's established precedent.

20

For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
court of appeals1 decision and remand the matter to the court of appeals for consideration
of defendant's other appellate issues.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /J

'day of February, 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

^2&&*-(
KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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GREENWOOD, Judge:
^1
Defendant David Hittle appeals his conviction and the trial
court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because
the trial court failed to advise Defendant of his right to a
speedy trial under Rule 11(e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.* While conceding that the trial court failed to
advise Defendant of his right to a speedy trial under rule
11(e)(3), the State argues that the error was harmless because
Defendant has failed to show that but for the trial court's
omission, he would have proceeded to trial. We reverse.

1. Defendant also argues that the trial court committed other
omissions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Since we reverse on
the ground that the trial court failed to inform Defendant of his
right to a speedy trial, we do not address these other issues.

BACKGROUND
^J2 Defendant was charged with a third degree felony and a class
A misdemeanor for criminal non-support, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999) . During a hearing in April 2000,
Defendant pleaded guilty to the class A misdemeanor, agreed to
pay all child support arrearages, and agreed to 36 months
probation in exchange for the State dropping the felony charge
and the trial court suspending his one year jail sentence.
However, during the rule 11 colloquy, the trial court failed to
inform Defendant of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court
stated the following:
Do you understand that by entering this plea
today . . . you are giving up your right to
go to trial; [your] right to confront and
cross examine witnesses, to present evidence
on your behalf or to refrain from presenting
evidence if you[] wish and to make the State
carry the burden of proving beyond reasonable
doubt all of the elements of the offense as
charged; to have witnesses brought on your
behalf to court to testify, with the
compulsion of a subpoena if necessary. You
have the right not to commit yourself unless
you choose to take the stand in which case
you would be subject to cross examination.
You have the right to, if you were to be
convicted and found guilty following a trial
by an impartial decision maker, or a jury in
this matter, you would have the right to
appeal. You're giving up those rights by
entering this plea today.
Defendant stated that he was prepared to give up those rights and
agreed that he understood the potential penalties for pleading
guilty to a class A misdemeanor. Furthermore, the Plea Agreement
Defendant signed did not include a provision waiving the right to
a speedy trial.
f3
On May 17, 2000, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion and this appeal
followed.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
f4
Because Defendant did not object below to the trial court's
omissions under rule 11, we review Defendant's claim for plain
error. We determine whether the trial court committed plain

onnnn-7i o.fA
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error as a matter of law.
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).

See State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 821

ANALYSIS
1|5
Since Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that the
trial court failed to inform him of his right to a speedy trial,
Defendant must show plain error. See State v. Garcia, 2001 UT
App 19,116, 18 P. 3d 1123. "'To succeed on a claim of plain error,
a defendant has the burden of showing (i) [a]n error exists; (ii)
che error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii)
the error is harmful.'" State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App
186,f11, 5 P.3d 1222 (citations and internal quotations omitted)
(alteration in original). "To show obviousness of the error,
[Defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of
trial." Garcia, 2001 UT App 19 at 16; see also State v. Ross,
951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Utah courts have
repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not plain where
there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court.").
Our review of Defendant's claim under each element of plain error
analysis is set forth below.
ii6 First, the trial court erred by failing to advise Defendant
of his right to a speedy trial. Under Rule 11(e) (3) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court may not accept a
guilty plea until it finds that the defendant knows that by
pleading guilty, he is waiving "the right to a speedy public
trial." In analyzing alleged rule 11 violations, we have held
that "strict compliance, rather than substantial compliance, with
Rule 11 is required when accepting a guilty plea." Tarnawiecki,
2000 UT App 186 at Hl2 (emphasis added); see also State v.
Maauire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991). The trial court did not
strictly comply with rule 11 because it failed to advise
Defendant of his right to a speedy trial either orally or in the
plea affidavit. Therefore, the trial court erred.
1(7 Second, this error should have been obvious to the trial
court in light of our opinion in Tarnawiecki. In Tarnawiecki,
the trial court failed to notify the defendant of her right "to a
speedy trial before an impartial jury" pursuant to rule 11. 2000
UT App 186 at 1l6. Because the defendant raised the issue for
the first time on appeal, we applied a plain error analysis and
held that the trial court's omission was an obvious error. See
id. at Hl8. We reasoned that in light of Utah appellate court
opinions requiring strict compliance with the rule 11 colloquy
requirements, the trial court should have known that failing to
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inform the defendant of her right to a "speedy trial before an
impartial jury" was error. Id. at 1l9. Therefore, like
Tarnawiecki, the trial court's failure to inform Defendant of his
right to a speedy trial was an obvious error.
H8
The State argues that the alleged error was not obvious
because Tarnawiecki is distinguishable from Defendant's case. In
Tarnawiecki, the trial court "wholly failed to advise [the]
defendant of her constitutional right to a speedy trial before an
impartial jury." Id. at Hl7. However, in Defendant's case, the
trial court omitted only the word "speedy" from the required rule
11 colloquy. Since the trial court complied with the requirements
of Tarnawiecki, with the exception of the word "speedy," the
State argues that the error was not obvious. However, because
"strict compliance, rather than substantial compliance, with Rule
11 is required when accepting a guilty plea," the State's
argument fails. Id. at 1|l2. Furthermore, the constitutional
right to a speedy trial is a distinct right of criminal
defendants, separate from the right to a trial before an
impartial jury. See U.S. Const, amend. VI. Thus, a defendant
must be informed of this right and knowingly waive it in order to
enter a valid guilty plea.
H9
Finally, the trial court's omission was harmful because the
omission dealt with a substantial constitutional right. See id.
It is well established under Utah law that we will presume harm
under plain error analysis when a trial court fails to inform a
defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11. See, e.g.,
Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186 at Hl8 (presuming harm when trial
court failed to inform Defendant that she was entitled to a
"speedy trial before an impartial jury"); State v. Ostler, 2000
UT App 28,111(25-26, 996 P. 2d 1065 (presuming harm where trial
court failed to inform defendant that he would waive certain
constitutional rights by pleading guilty); State v. Pharris, 798
P.2d 772, 774 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (same).
H10 The reason for presuming harm is that by not knowing which
rights a defendant is waiving, the defendant cannot make a fully
informed decision. See Ostler, 2000 UT App 28 at 125. If the
defendant is not fully informed of his rights prior to pleading
guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be voluntary. See id. We
cannot accept an involuntary guilty plea and still claim to have
done justice. Therefore, because the trial court failed to
advise Defendant of his substantial constitutional right to a
speedy trial, we presume harm.

onr\r\r\m o .ra
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CONCLUSION
Ull Because the trial court committed plain error in advising
Defendant of his rights, we reverse and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

Pamela T. Greenwoda, Judge

Jarfn^s Z. Davi£; Judge

William-A. Thome J r . , / J u d g e
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Addendum B

tpon arraignment, except ror an infraction, a defendant -hail be
a
^presented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court The
jetendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
, b> A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty
ic) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
,d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise,the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
ie> The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
11) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
i B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial nsk of conviction;
15) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the court has established
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
affidavit. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by
the court.
'2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.
(ha 1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
t2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
'3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-tnal motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
tj) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997.)
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SANDY, UTAH; APRIL 20, 2000
HONORABLE JUDGE DENISE P. LINDBERG
P R O C E E D I N G S
MR. TORRENCE:

Okay, Your Honor, I believe we have a

resolution worked out here if the Court approves.

What's

anticipated is that in return for a guilty plea to Count 1,
criminal non-support is a Class A misdemeanor, the State would
be willing to amend the information to dismiss Count 2 in its
entirety.

I have gone over with him to (inaudible) entering a

misdemeanor guilty plea including his rights to a jury trial
and other rights that he would be giving up by entering into
the plea bargain.

We have also discussed the consequence of

entering a guilty plea to a Class A misdemeanor including that
the Court could impose up to 365 days in jail and impose a fir.e
of $2500 to which an 85 percent surcharge could be added.
Part of our understanding with the attorney general's
office is that Mr. Hittle would be agreeing to pay back the coamount of arrears owing on his child support figured at the
rate of - which was figured at the rate originally of $275 a
month.

So that what he would be paying, is that he would start

paying the ongoing child support of $275 a month and in
addition to that he would pay a figure toward his arrears of
principle and interest which, based on the figure of about
earning $11.00 an hour we assume it would be somewhere in the
range of $272.00, $275.00 a month.

We have not - rather

5 2^0.00 to 3285.00 a month.

We don't have that exact figure

yet because that will depend on the next job that he takes ar.z
exactly how much his hourly and monthly rate is.
THE COURT:

That's -

So he would be paying approximately

$550.00 per month?
MR. TORRENCE:

Approximately $550.00/$560.00 a month,

assuming he earns about $11.00 an hour at his next job.
THE COURT:

Is he between jobs?

What's the status

there?
MR. HITTLE:
Judge.

I work day labor when I can find a job,

As I explained to the attorneys in the conference room,

every time I go to work the garnishment is attached to my
check.

At $11.00 an hour that figures out to be $444.00 a week

at 40 hours.

They automatically take half of that on the

garnishment which is $222.00, taxes on the $444.00 is well over
$100.00 and that leaves me with somewhere around $100.00 a week
to live on.

I'm behind on my rent.

notices on my electric bill.

I've had discontinuance

My gas is shut off.

I've sought

help from the local church organizations and I can at least
keep my head above water by picking up day labor where there's
no garnishment.
MR. TORRENCE:

So Your Honor, our understanding with

the plea bargain would be that the attorney general's office
would be recommending that Mr. Hittle receive a suspended jail
sentence and be allowed to continue out on probation for 36

months and that he, as we stated, cegin paying the S2"5.:: z
month ongoing child support as well as the to-be-determined
figure toward his arrears based on his next full time job.
THE COURT:

Well, what I want to know is effective

when would this kind of payment schedule begin then?
MR. TORRENCE:

I guess that would be up to the Court.

Our understanding was that would be as soon as he's able to
obtain full time employment.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Hittle, before I accept

this proposed resolution, I want to review with you what
matters that counsel has probably already covered with you but
that are important for me to put on the record.

You understand

that - well first of all, you understand this proposed
resolution as a way of, the proposal as a way of dealing with
this matter?
MR. HITTLE:

I understand it as being one of the ways

of dealing with it, yes.
THE COURT:

More to the point, do you agree with this

as a way of resolving this matter or do you wish to proceed zz
trial?
MR. HITTLE

I've been placed under considerable

duress but I'll agree to it.
THE COURT:

Well, you can either freely and

voluntarily enter into this plea bargain or we can go to trial,
but if there are continuing reservations or issues about this

chen - my duty is to establish that you are entering ir.tc tr.is
plea bargain from your own personal decision that this is

m

your best interest to proceed in light of all circumstances
that you're facing.

If you are not prepared to accept that ::

believe that that is the appropriate resolution then I, you
know, I think counsel has already indicated to you that you car.
go forward with trial.

So the question again is, in light c£

all the circumstances do you agree with this as a resolution
for handling this matter?
MR. HITTLE:

All the circumstances have not been

brought forward yet at this point, one of which was fraud on my
ex-wife's part at the time of filing.
THE COURT:

That is a matter for a different setting.

That's not the issue here.

The issue here for me is, you are

looking at an offer to plead to a Class A misdemeanor in
exchange for dismissal of a third degree felony with an
understanding of what the penalties can be on this Class A and
either accepting the proposed resolution or not accepting it
and proceed to trial on the felony and the Class A.
the issues.

Those are

That is the sole issue before me.

Let me go about it this way.

Do you understand that

by entering this plea today as it has been proposed you are
giving up your right to go to trial; you're right to confront
and cross examine witnesses, to present evidence on your behalf
or to refrain from presenting evidence if your wish and to make

the State carry the burden of proving beyond reasonable ::u::
all of the elements of the offense as charged;

to have

witnesses brought on your behalf to court to testify, with the
compulsion of a subpoena if necessary.

You have the right not

to commit yourself unless you choose to take the stand in which
case you would be subject to cross examination.

You have the

right to, if you were to be convicted and found guilty
following a trial by an impartial decision maker, or a jury in
this matter, you would have the right to appeal.
up those rights by entering this plea today.

You're giving

Do you understand

that?
MR. HITTLE:

I understand that I'm giving up those

rights.
THE COURT:
MR. HITTLE:
THE COURT:

And you're prepared to do that?
I'm prepared to do it.
Okay.

And you understand as Mr. Torrence

has explained, that you could be facing a maximum sentence of
up to a year in jail and fines including a surcharge of over
$4600?
MR. HITTLE:
THE COURT:

I understand that.
Has there been any other offer, threat,

or whatever offer given to you, made to you to get you to enter
into this plea other than what has been said here in court?
MR. HITTLE:

The thing that disturbs me, Judge, is

the State refuses to consider that there was fraud involved.

:

understand I'm supposed to take that up elsewhere.
THE COURT:

Okay.

But to get you to enter this plea,

there have been no other offers, no other threats, nothing else
given to you to get you to enter this plea?

What I'm getting

at is, this is something that you are choosing to do
voluntarily?
MR. HITTLE:

I am doing it voluntarily because as I

said before there has been a lot of stress involved, duress.
THE COURT:

Are you today under the influence of

alcohol, drugs or any physical or mental condition that would
affect your ability to enter this plea?
MR. HITTLE:
THE COURT:

Other than frustration, no.
Okay.

Are you satisfied with the advice

that you've received with Counsel?
MR. HITTLE: No.
THE COURT:

Well, in that case, do you wish to move

forward or not?
MR. HITTLE:

I'll move forward.

I've had some other

thoughts on this and I know of other ways to approach it so I
will move forward.
THE COURT:
that is liable here.

Mr. Torrence isn't going to be to the one
You will be, so I want to make very sure

that you understand MR. HITTLE:
THE COURT:

I know and I realize that.
Okay.

He can give you advice but ycu car.

tr.ocse to disregard it if you wish.
MR. TORRENCE:

If I could request of the Court, rust

so we determine if Mr. Hittle is in fact making a knowing a:.:
intelligent voluntary plea, I would request the Court to as*
him the nature of his dissatisfaction with my service so we can
determine if that impacts his ability to make a decision.
THE COURT:

I think that's a fair request.

Mr, Hittle, can you please articulate what it is that
is the problem?
MR. HITTLE:

He has refused to put certain things to

this Court that I wanted to put forward to this Court.
what happened.
ago.

You saw

You witnessed what happened here a few minutes

They came up with a fraudulent amount, they have dollar

figures for me and I asked where they got it from, they had :D
change it.

Like I said, there's been fraud from square one ::.

this case.

Right now this seems to be the expedient way to go.

THE COURT:

Do you understand that for me to accept

your guilty plea, I either have to receive from you an
acknowledgment that you are, in fact, guilty of these charges
to which you are pleading or that you concede that the State
could prove the facts even if you are not prepared to concede
them, that you are prepared to concede that the State could
make its case.
MR. HITTLE:

I will repeat that I realize this the

expedient way to go at this time.

I've made the decision and

Z'11

live with it.
THE COURT:

All right, let me indicate to you

specifically you understand the nature of the elements and the
elements of the offense to which you are entering a guilty plea
in this case is a Class A misdemeanor?
MR. HITTLE:
THE COURT:

I do.
And it's alleged that you knowingly

failed to provide for support for your minor child, that child
being eighteen years of age and in circumstances that are needy
or would be needy but for support received from a source other
that defendant.
MR. HITTLE:

I understand what the elements are.

THE COURT:

Do you also understand that there is a

factual basis - and I'm going to ask for that factual basis in
a moment - but for me to accept this factual basis, it either
has to establish that the charged crime was actually committed
by you or if you refuse or are otherwise unable to admit
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to
establish a substantial risk of your conviction.
MR. HITTLE:

I understand it under the way the law is

written that they have reason to present their case, whether
they can prove it or not is another story, but they have reason
to (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Now, you would have to concede that there

is a substantial likelihood that the State could proceed, has a

sufficient basis to proceed and establish a substantia: ris< ::
your conviction and that as a result you're making this as a
knowing, voluntary determination that this is the option that
you would rather pursue.
MR. TORRENCE:

That's what's at issue here.
If you want to do that, you would net

necessarily have to admit every element of the offense.
Your Honor, just for the record I did approach Mr.
Peterson just a minute ago to see if he would consider a no
contest plea for Mr. Hittle in this matter.

He has indicated

that the State would not agree to a no contest plea.
What the Judge is talking about here in terms of a
plea, you can either enter a guilty plea which would knowingly
admit that you did all the elements of the offense that we
discussed here and committed the conduct mentioned, or you
could enter what is called a THE COURT:
MR. TORRENCE:

Alford.
- guilty plea pursuant to North

Carolina v Alford which means that you are admitting guilty

m

the sense that you are accepting responsibility and the
consequences with a guilty plea because you believe the State
has sufficierit evidence to create a substantial likelihood that
you would be found guilty but you would not have to necessary
admit each and every element of the offense.

The result would

be the same in terms of the sentencing.
MR. HITTLE:

I think that might work two ways too.

I

mean, I can say that I could think they have i: or : can say :
think they don't have it.

That's an unknown as this time.

will admit to it that they might have it, I don't know.
nobody knows that at this time.
MR. TORRENCE:

I

I mean

Not even you know that.

The question is do you want to enter a

guilty plea or not?
THE COURT: Essentially you are weighing on the
balance your risk of proceeding with the prosecution and trial
or opting to take this plea because there is a substantial
likelihood that they could prove their case in which case
would be facing a felony.

Those are the issues.

you

That's the

issue and as a result of that weighing, you've decided that ycu
are prepared to assume that responsibility for that.
MR. DITTLE:

As I've said I see this is the expedient

way to go at this point.

In other words, I realize that they

could probably prove the case, it's the way the law is written.
In that case, Your Honor, I would ask

MR. TORRENCE:

that if Mr. Hittle does enter a guilty plea here today that
would be considered a guilty plea a guilty plea pursuant to
North Carolina v Alford.
THE COURT:

That would be the only basis under which

I could so do it.
MR. DITTLE:
THE COURT:
please?

I can agree with that.
All right.

Can I get counsel to approach

(Whereupon a sidebar was held.)
THE COURT:

Mr. Hittle, I want you to know that tr.e

reason I called counsel is that I wanted to confirm with them
and I want to confirm with you, that this is in fact a knew:::,
intelligent, and voluntary plea on your part and while I
recognize your great reluctance to enter this plea, based en
your last comment I understand those to be an acknowledgment en
your part that there is a substantial likelihood or risk that
the State could prove its case, in which case this is your best
assessment of your options in light of all the circumstances
and that as a result you are making a deliberate decision to
proceed this way rather than go to trial.
MR. HITTLE:
THE COURT:
MR. HITTLE:

In light of the circumstances Is that a fair characterization?
- and the way the law is written, this

is the expedient way for me at this point.
THE COURT:

And what I have just said to you in terms

of how I understand what you're saying to me, you agree that
this, that this is a decision that you are making with full
understanding of its ramifications and what MR. HITTLE:
THE%COURT:

As I understand at this point, yes.
All right.

I have no, I do not have any

questions as to your competence to enter this plea, I just want
to make sure we are all on the same page as to where you are
with this plea and what responsibility that you are assuming

ror it.
2

All right.

In light of all that has been discussed,

3

how do you plead to one court of criminal non-support as a

4

Class A misdemeanor?

5 :

MR. HITTLE:

Guilty.

i

6 ]

THE COURT:

And Counsel, can you please outline the

i

7 ! factual basis and support the plea?
i

8 |

MR. TORRENCE:

Yes Your Honor, and again for the

9 ! record I would request that guilty plea be entered as 10 I

THE COURT:

It will be entered as an Alford plea,

i

11 ! guilty pursuant to Alford.

i
12

MR. TORRENCE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

13 i

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, the factual basis for the

14 I Class A misdemeanor is that between February 1, 1997 and
to provide support for his minor child, Kimberly Hittle, during
16
15
November 30, 1997, during that time Mr. Hittle knowingly failed
the period of time when she was under eighteen years of age and
17
18

was in needy circumstances or would have been in needy

19

circumstances but for support received from a source other than

20

;

21 !

himself or paid on his behalf.
THE COURT:

All right.

You acknowledge those facts

22 I as outlined?
i
23 '

MR. HITTLE:

24 I

THE COURT:

Yes.
All right, Mr. Hittle, in light of that :

25 ' believe that the facts support the plea which you are entering

and I am going to accept your plea as a knowing and vclur.uary
plea.

I want you to understand that by entering this plea, r.f

of the rights that you are giving up is the right to appeal,
but you do have thirty days within which you can move this
Court to withdraw your plea if you give me a good reason in
writing for that request.

Do you understand what I've just

said?
MR. HITTLE:
THE COURT:

Yes, I understand that.
All right.

MR. TORRENCE:

Excuse me, Your Honor, for the recora

I have informed Mr. Hittle that good cause to withdraw his
guilty plea would be more than changing his mind but coming up
with what he considers new evidence.

He would have to show

that he was - I'm sorry - he was either under the influence of
medication or drugs or in someway was not fully able to
understand and appreciate what he was doing here today.
THE COURT:

All right.

And you understand that, Mr. Hittle?
MR. HITTLE:

I understand that part of it but I would

also understand that I considered the fact that there are
subpoenas out to various employers getting information on
withholding that are not in at this time and that could
seriously change things too.
THE COURT:
MR. HITTLE:

I'm not sure I follow.
Withholding.

THE COURT:

Right.

MR. HITTLE:

Okay, that could seriously change

certain accusations here.

If they come back.as I think they

might and show that I actually did make *x' number of payments
'x' number of times.
THE COURT:

Mr. Hittle, all of these issues, that is

what we are here about right now.
MR. PETERSON:

Your .Honor, the one sense in which

that wouldn't change the picture, is that if the information
that we're trying to get from his past employers and the State
Unemployment Office show that he has, in fact, paid more money
already than the State already recognizes, then that THE COURT:

Then that would certainly go toward the

amount that he owes.
MR. PETERSON:

That's right, that would reduce the

total amount that he owes.
THE COURT:

Correct.

But that does not eliminate

that, or go toward the basis for withdrawing the plea under
this charge.
MR. HITTLE:
MR. PETERSON:

May I say something?
That's correct, Your Honor.

If he

needs more than that MR. HITTLE:

It could also mean that there are *x'

number of months where payments were made and it's being shown
that they're not being made.

In other words -

THE COURT:

That goes toward the total amount of

money that you would be owing and that is a determination that
is going to be made as part of sentencing in terms of what you
owe and there will be information requested that is going to
provide that.
MR. HITTLE:

That's not what I'm talking about.

I'm

talking about the statute reads that not making any payments
for 18 months during a given 24-period month, right?
MR. TORRENCE:

You did not plead guilty to the third

degree felony so that's not relevant.

For the Class A

misdemeanor, all you're acknowledging is that you failed to
provide support.

It's not for any set number of months and

it's not any set dollar amount.
THE COURT:

So do you understand that?

All that that would do is that if in

fact, you were not credited, you know, with certain payments
that in fact you did make, that would just go towards the
arrearage that you would then be required to address.

But you

understand that that would not constitute good cause for
changing or withdrawing the plea?
MR. HITTLE:

If that's the way it's written, that's

the way it's written, Your Honor. (Inaudible) much argument
with that then.
THE COURT:

All right.

I am accepting this plea but

I've got to let you know counsel, I have, I think Mr. Hittie
has given every indication that he's feeling himself dragged

into this and yet he is also acknowledging chat he 13 prepare 1
to go forward with it and I am feeling very much caught in ire
middle in terms of a determination as to whether or not ::
accept this plea.

I conclude that on balance Mr. Hittle has

addressed the elements of Rule 11 and he is in fact making an
intelligent and knowing plea, although clearly not one that he
feels is fully voluntary on his part.

That is an issue that :

am concerned about but again I think that the question of
voluntariness doesn't go to any coercion that has been imposed
upon Mr. Hittle, but certainly, but simply his own sense as zo
the fairness of the proceedings in which he is - or the options
that he is faced with.

And given that kind of narrow

definition of whether I'm seeing this as a voluntary or
involuntary plea, I am going to accept the plea but I just have
to say and I want to it put on the record that I am troubled by
this.
MR. TORRENCE:

And again, Your Honor, in abundance of

caution, perhaps as the Court can request from Mr. Hittle as to
any duress that he feels he's under right now that has not
already been brought up to the Court?
THE COURT:
MR. HITTLE:

Mr. Hittle?
Can I tell you a story, Judge, what

happened to a friend of mine?
THE COURT:

Well, sir, I don't know about any friend

of yours being relevant to this.

What I want to know is about

1

you, that's what's relevant to me.

2

MR, HITTLE:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. HITTLE:

5

This I think you will see is relevant.
Okay.
A friend of mine ran afoul of the law

through a divorce many years ago, middle '80's, his name is

6 ; Paul.

He ended up in a halfway house and then got out on his

i

7 ; own.
i.

8 I

I was at the time in a singles group, voluntary

9 ! singles group providing assistance to individuals at that
10 i halfway house, Bonneville Corrections, providing transportation
11 i for some of the residents there.

I kept track of Paul over the

12 : years and some years ago, I don't know when, he was in the
13 . hospital visiting a nurse friend of his when a judge was
i

14 I brought in on a gurney.

The judge and Paul got involved in

i

15

talking somehow or another.

16 j there.

Paul told the judge of his past and what had happened

17 j and what had gone on.
18
19

I don't know the circumstances

The judge as soon as he was able,

expunged the record.
!

Now, there are certain things that have gone on pritr

20 ; to this case here today, that need to be addressed.
21 ! mentioned fraud.

I

In other words what I'm saying is a judge in

22 i the State of Utah is a judge in the State of Utah.

What I'm

i

23

saying is I feel personally that you can address certain things

24

that I've been told can't be brought up here.

25 ;

THE COURT:

Counsel, can you comment?

I'd like to

near from either.
MR. TORRENCE:
THE COURT:

Can we approach, Your Honor?

You may.

(Whereupon a sidebar conference was held.)
THE COURT:

All right, Mr. Hittle, it has been a long

day but, I'm not quite sure I know where you're going or what:
you're alluding to.
MR. HITTLE:

I would be happy to take it up at

another time.
THE COURT:

No.

Let's deal with it now, if I find

that it is something that I can't deal with I will tell you ana
if it's something I can deal with, then I will.
MR. HITTLE:

Okay, at the time of the divorce, my ex-

wife or wife at the time, claimed by sworn affidavit that I was
negligent and had made $15.00 an hour.

I took into the

courtroom and I have it here with me today, pay stubs that
showed I was making $9.42 an hour.
fraud on her part.
fraud.
it?

That is pure unadulterated

She knew better.

She intended to commit

It's what can I get from the system; how far can I milk

And that is proven under Federal case law California

versus Serhan, intend is proven when the act is committed,
okay?

She intended to commit the fraud and that was on - and

this support stems directly from that.
THE COURT:

I also have -

So what you're challenging is the

underlying child support obligation that was imposed by and

1

signed off by another judge?

2

;

3

!

MR. HITTLE:

Yes.

And I also have with me today a

copy of the minute entry by at that time Commissioner Buehier

4 • but later signed by the judge, a statement or an order I guess
it would be called that I do not make one payment until Z - I

5

6 I do not owe one red cent until the defendant, being my ex-wife,
i

7 i my wife at the time, verifies all the monies correctly.

I r.ave

I
8 | never seen that to this day, judge, never.
9 i

THE COURT:

10 I
11 j that.

MR. HITTLE:

Okay.
Under the statute, I have a right to

i

12 |

THE COURT:

Let me indicate to you that this is not

i

13 i the appropriate place and the reason for that is because child
j

14 j support obligations or the other kinds of orders associated
15 j with the divorce are retained in the jurisdiction of the court
16 j that issued those orders.

If there were problems or issues

17 j related to that, the appropriate forum for that was back in
18 : that court with whatever evidence you have or with a filing of
19 ; request to modify the child support obligation with your
20 i evidence and the court would have taken, would have held a
!

21 i hearing on the matter and adjudicated the matter and determined
22 j whether or not the child support obligation that had been
23 ' ordered should be amended or not.
24

:

I am assuming that you

either didn't do that or it got adjudicated contrary to your

i

25 ! view of how it should have been done.
j

But, either you didn't

1

challenge it or it got handled, you know, against you cut

2 ' whatever may have been the case and in the terms of the
3

correctness of that adjudication, it is beyond my authority ::

4

second guess or go back and determine whether or not that

5 , obligation, in fact, arose or not.

I have to accept that tne

6 j obligation is as has been stated and that it was pursuant to a
7

!

proper court order that you knew and had had opportunity to

i

8 ' address in the appropriate forum-

So as to, you know, I don't

9 : know that history but that is not something that I can take
10 | cognizance of.
11 :

MR. HITTLE:

The last thing Judge Wilkinson said the

i

12 j last time we were before him was, I don't want to see this case
|

13 | in front of me again-

I've filed paperwork since then and he's

14 ! never accepted anything-

I have gone through what you've said,

15 ; okay, and it's not been heard.
16 i

THE COURT:

Okay-

I'm not going to second guess

17 i another sitting judge about a matter under which the court
18

retains jurisdiction.

That is not an issue that even if I

19 i wanted to, which I'm not inclined to go there, but even if I
20 ; wanted to, it would not be an appropriate exercise of my...it's
21 j beyond my authority to do that.

But, what I wanted to do in

22 j terms of ascertaining what it was that you were getting at was

i
23 '• to make sure that I understood what the basis of your concern
i

24 • was and whether it was - well, I just wanted to understand what
25 ! the basis of your concern was. I think you've addressed to my

1
2

satisfaction what it is that you feel the underlying orcc.er. .
!

and as I've told you, that's not something that I can

3

legitimately address.

All I can address is, I have to assume

4

that the child support obligation that you were given and that

5 , was ordered was an appropriate and lawful order and that you
I

6 ! failed to follow through with that lawful order of the court
7 ! and you did so to such an extent that this became a criminal
8 ; matter.
9 |

That's where I come in.
MR. HITTLE:

That's your prerogative,

I recognize

10 i it.

11 j

THE COURT:

Unless counsel you have some concerns, I

12 ; do not have any competency concerns.
13 I

MR. TORRENCE:

No, Your Honor, I believe that Mr.

i
14 I Hittle is fully competent today in this Court.
15 |

THE COURT:

All right, if Mr. Hittle could then sign

16 | the Statement of Defendant, it will be incorporated into the
i

17 .; record.
18

!

MR. PETERSON:

And again for the record, Your Honor,

19 : Mr. Hittle is entering a guilty plea to criminal non-support.
20
THE COURT: As a Class A misdemeanor.
21 !
MR. PETERSON: As a Class A misdemeanor, Utah Code
i

22 | 76-7-201 and the statement of specific comprising elements
23

;

indicates that "I knowingly failed to provide support for my

24 ' minor child, Kimberly, when she was under eighteen years old
25 : and in needy circumstances or would have been in needy

circumstances but for support received from another source."
THE COURT:

Correct.

MR. TORRENCE:

For the record therefore Mr. Hittle

has signed the Statement of Defendant.
THE COURT:

All right.

I have also signed the

statement certifying that in this Court's view Mr. Hittle has
entered a knowing and voluntary plea and as I said, you do have
30 days within which, for good cause as explained to you, you
can request or withdraw the plea if you make that request in
writing.
All right.

What - I do have information, I don't

know that a pre-sentence report would particularly assist the
Court further in addressing this matter.

So unless Counsel

think it would be helpful to the Court, I MR, PETERSON:

I'm sorry.

We're not requesting that,

Your Honor.
MR. TORRENCE:
THE COURT:

No, we're not requesting that.

All right.

In that case, given that

there has been a proposed, that the proposed disposition also
includes some recommendations in terms of sentencing, and Mr.
Hittle, counsel, you are waiving his sentencing time on his
behalf.

Let me just explain.
Mr. Hittle, you have the right to not be sentenced

today, to wait at least two days.

You can be sentenced within

two days from now or forty-five days, somewhere in that penca

or since we're here now, we can proceed with sentencing.

Zz

you want to be sentenced now or do you wish to come back in t
days?
MR. HITTLE:

Might as well do it now.

It's prcbabl

going to be the same.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, first let me indicate that

as part of the plea negotiations and in recognition of your
plea to the Class A misdemeanor, the remaining count of third
degree felony is hereby dismissed.
Mr. Hittle, I am imposing a sentence which for now
will be suspended but which if we have any problems in
compliance with the orders of this Court, will result in an
imposition of this sentence and if I have to impose it, it wi
be consecutive to anything else that he's holding you at that
time.

So I am imposing a term of 365 days suspended.

I am

placing you on probation with Adult Probation and Parole for
period of 36 months•

You will have five business days within

which to report to Adult Probation and Parole and make
arrangements to initiate probation with them.

First, and

foremost is your obligation under probation is that you will
commit no other new violations of the law and that you will
abide by all the lawful orders of this Court and any other
court that has jurisdiction over any matter in which you are
involved.

You are to abide by the usual and ordinary

conditions of probation by AP&P, of AP&P.

It has been propcs

and I accept that you will be making payment of restitu::::. a:.:
for arrearage equal and in an amount to be determined and
provided to this Court.
How long will it take, counsel?
MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

Sixty days?

MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

We can get that figure in -

Thirty days is sufficient.

All right.

Then that figure will be

provided, but my understanding is that you will be paying in
the neighborhood of $550 per month.

The first payment will be

due in 30 days and thereafter every 30 days until the full
amount is paid and that full amount will be provided to the
court within 30 days by the State.

You will be notified and if

you contest that amount then you can request a hearing.
In addition I am imposing $250 in recoupment for
services of counsel in this matter.

I am not going to - given

that there are substantial arrearages and restitution owing, :
am not going to impose an additional fine.
I am going to add a couple of other conditions
because I am - it's clear to me that you still have not dealt
with this in any kind of a productive way - your own emotions
and anger over this matter.

Accordingly I am going to refer

you to Valley Mental Health and I'm going to require you at a
minimum to sign up for and complete their Anger Management
Program.

In short, no new violations of the law, 36

^or.zr.s

probation with AP&P, you're to report to them within five
business days.

You are to pay restitution in the amount of

approximately $550 a month, interest will accrue on the
judgment and so the sooner and the more that you pay, the less
expensive the cost will be over time for you but we will be
looking for those payments.

You will be making those payments.

Are those payments going to be coming to the court, are they
going to go to ORS, who are they going to go to?
MR. HITTLE:

Your Honor, OR has shown me they are

seriously incompetent.
THE COURT:

I don't want to deal with them anymore.
Normally in these kinds of matters, it is

just handled by ORS, I'm just wondering if...
MR. HITTLE:

I'm objecting to dealing with them.

I've been there many times and tried to get somebody to
cooperate with me in the past years.
they've ignored me.

I've written letters and

I've asked them for a complete file,

complete history of this case.

I'll pick it up at the will

call office, and I've never seen a paper.
MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, perhaps to belay some of

the concerns, payments, if Mr. Hittle would make the check out
to ORS but then send it to our office, then we can expedite
that.

We can make sure that it was properly credited.

Ms.

Hepworth from our office, she monitors probation and is working
several cases and she's capable of doing that.

1
2

THE COURT:
l

MR* HITTLE:

4 i

THE COURT:

;

The alternative ccula ce ::. = •

they could be paid to the court and then the court could z'~er.

3 '

5

All right.

I'm not going to take it to the court.
If we did this would we have to have it

cut to us and then we could cut another check?

6 j

MS. ?:

7 i

THE COURT:

8 I hold it how long?

(Inaudible)
That's going to again delay.

Fifteen working days?

We have to

So that's going to

I
9 j create a real delay.
10 |
MR. HITTLE:

I would say this.

It would not be a

11 i check it would be a money order or a cashier's check.

i
12 i

MR. TORRENCE:

Your Honor, if the Court were to orcie:

13 | Mr. Hittle to make the payments, the money orders, to ORS and
14 J deliver them to ORS or the attorney general's office, Mr.
15 j Hittle could certainly make a photo copy of the front of the
16 | money order or check before he sends it in then he could keep
17 j track of

exactly how much he has paid in case there's a

18 j question later on whether payments were made or not.
i

19 :
THE COURT: Based on what I'm being told, and I was
I
20 j just offering how to do it, but if the policy of the Third
i

21 | District is that we would have to hold it for 15 days, that is
22 j just going to create further delays and further problems, so I
l

23 j think that Mr. Torrence's suggestion is probably the best is

i
24 j that you keep copies of what you are sending so that you have
l

25 ! independent documentation of what has been paid in payments ::

GRS, but I will rather than have them go to ORS directly, I 3T
going to have them go to the attorney general's office.

Have

the money orders made out to ORS but to be sent to the AG's
office - to Ms. Hepworth?
MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, for the record, the

Attorney General's Office is P. 0. Box 104814, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114-0814.
THE COURT:
Mr. Hittle.

All right, and that will be provided to

But it is always a good practice for you to

retain, to make a photocopy and keep that record.
MR. HITTLE:

I've got pay check stubs from the

withholding that the employers sent to ORS and they're still
accusing me of not having paid it.
THE COURT:

Well, that's why I'm having it go to the

attorney general's office instead of directly to ORS.

That

then becomes another cross check of what you are, in fact, hav
paid independent of what ORS may ascertain.
MR. HITTLE:
years for this?

Fifteen days, they've waited how many

What's 15 more days going to do?

THE COURT:

Well, it's the accumulative effect of

delaying by another half a month again the payment that is
owed, so the order will be that the money order will be made t
OR but will be sent to care of Ms. Hepworth at the attorney
general's office.
MR. TORRENCE:

Your Honor, so we could reach

determination on this of a figure that is the order of the
Court, the final figure, could we set a review hearing in this
for perhaps a period of 45 days out so that after I receive the
proposed figure from the attorney general's office, I will
certainly get in contact with Mr. Hittle, we do have subpoenas
out to some of past employers and the State Unemployment
Compensation Office.

So once we get together with that

information, if we're not able to somehow agree to those
figures of the AG's Office that might insure that we all get
back together as some time.
THE COURT:

That makes sense.

MR. TORRENCE:

And the court can determine exactly

what that (inaudible).
THE COURT:

How about Monday, June 12th?

MR. TORRENCE:
THE COURT:

I'm sorry, what time was that?

We can do it either 9:00 o'clock or 2:00

o'clock or 1:30.
MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

All right. 1:30?

MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

1:30 would be better.

1:30 Monday, June 12?

Monday, June 12th.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.)
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121 Criminal Law € = > 1031(4)
MOk 1031 (4> Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court of the United States
UNITED STATES, Petitioner,
v.
Alphonso VONN.

Defendant who lets error in trial court's guilty plea
colloquy pass without objection may only obtain
appellate reversal because of such error upon
showing that error was plain and that it affected his
substantial rights. Fed.Rules (. VJY^eJRiijes 11(h),
52(b), ! 8 l . S . ( A.

No. 00-973.
Argued Nov. 6,2001.
Decided March 4,2002.

Defendant was convicted of armed bank robbery,
conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and carrying
firearm during crime of violence, following entry of
guilty pleas in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California, James M. Ideman, J.
Defendant appealed. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 224 F.3d 1152.
vacated and remanded. Certiorari was granted. The
Supreme Court, Justice Souter, held that: (1)
unobjected-to error in trial court's guilty plea
colloquy was reversible only upon showing that such
error was plain and that it affected defendant's
substantial rights, and (2) appellate court could look
to entire record when determining whether
defendant's substantial rights had been affected.
Vacated and remanded.
Justice Stevens concurred in part, dissented in part,
and filed opinion.

West Headnotes
ill Criminal Law C=>1028
UftkHHS Most. Cited Cases
Issue not raised below is nevertheless preserved for
appellate review if made by current litigant in recent
proceeding upon which lower court relied for its
resolution of issue, and litigant did not concede
correctness of that precedent in current case.

LH Courts €==>85(3)
I06K85<3) Most Cited Cases
In absence of a clear legislative mandate, Advisory
Committee Notes provide reliable source of insight
into meaning of Rule of Criminal Procedure.
Fed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rtde I et sen., IS U.S.C.A.
HI Courts €=>85(2)
106k85<2) Most Cited Cases
HI Statutes € = > 195
361 k!95 Most Cited Cases
Statutory construction canon, that expressing one
item of commonly associated group or series
excludes another left unmentioned, is only guide,
whose fallibility can be shown by contrary
indications that adopting particular rule or statute was
probably not meant to signal any exclusion of its
common relatives.
151 Courts €==>83
100k83 Most Cited Cases
Repeal of criminal procedural rule by implication is
disfavored.
J61 Criminal Law €==> 1031 (4)
H0U031(4) Most Cited (.uses
Appellate court may consult entire record when
considering whether unobjected- to error in trial
court's guilty plea colloquy affected defendant's
substantial rights. J:J&lJ*ute
18P.S.C.A.
*1044 Syllabus i f N l i
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Lll The syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader.
See Ijli&fiL
S/-m;N ;;. Jhiroir Timber >£ Lumhcj- tV-<

:m t..,s. n\% ,u~..2<> sx t. 282, 50 i .EU
Federal..Rule of C"Hnitnal Procedure II lays out
steps that a judge must take to ensure that a guilty
plea is knowing and voluntary.
Rule H(ht's
requirement that any variance from those procedures
"which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded" is similar to the general "harmlesserror" rule in Bll!£JLllii}- However, IluJbLjJLliii
does not include a plain-error provision comparable
t° ..BiLiL.£.!i.!!}.> which provides that a defendant who
fails to object to trial error may nonetheless have a
conviction reversed by showing among other things
that plain error affected his substantial rights. After
respondent Vonn was charged with federal bank
robbery and firearm crimes, the Magistrate Judge
twice advised him of his constitutional rights,
including the right to be represented by counsel at
every stage of the proceedings; Vonn signed a
statement saying that he had read and understood his
rights; and he answered yes to the court's questions
whether he had understood the court's explanation of
his rights and whether he had read and signed the
statement.
When Vonn later pleaded guilty to
robbery, the court advised him of the constitutional
rights he was relinquishing, but skipped the advice
required by Rule (ll)(c)(3) that he would have the
right to assistance of counsel at trial. Subsequently,
Vonn pleaded guilty to the firearm charge and to a
later-charged conspiracy count. Again, the court
advised him of therightshe was waiving, but did not
mention the right to counsel. Eight months later,
Vonn moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the
firearm charge but did not cite Rule 11 error. The
court denied the motion and sentenced him. On
appeal, he sought to set aside all of his convictions,
for the first time raising Rule 11. The Ninth Circuit
agreed that there had been error and held that Vonn's
failure to object before the District Court to the Rule,
H. omission was of no import because Rule \\jjij
subjects all Rule 11 violations to harmless-error
review. Declining to go beyond the plea proceeding
in considering whether Vonn was aware of his rights,
the court held that the Government had not met its

burden, under harmless-error review, of showing no
effect on substantial rights, and vacated the
convictions.
Held:
1. A defendant who lets Rjlk J J. error pass without
objection in the trial court must satisfy Ruh_5.2? j>}'s
plain-error rule. Pp. 1048-1054.
(a) Relying on the canon that expressing one item of
a commonly associated group or series excludes
another left unmentioned, Vonn claims that RjyuV_
11 <h )'s specification of harmless-error review shows
an intent to exclude the plain-error standard with
which harmless error is paired in Ruse 51 However,
this canon is only a guide, whose fallibility can be
shown by contrary indications that adopting a
particular rule or statute was probably not meant to
signal any exclusion of its common relatives. Here,
the harmless- and plain-error alternatives are
associated together in Rule 52, having apparently
equal dignity with Rule 1 l(h)t and applying by its
terms to error in the application of any other Rule of
Criminal Procedure. To hold that Rule H(h)'s terms
imply that the latter half of Rule 52 has no
application to Rule 11 errors would amount to
finding a partial repeal of Rule 52(h) by implication,
a result sufficiently disfavored, Ruck eh ha us r u
Monsanto Co.. 467 i.S. 086, 10? 7, 104 S.Ct. 28^2>
81 L.Eri.2d 815, as to require strong support.
Support, however, is not readily found, for Vonn has
merely selected one possible interpretation of the
supposedly intentional omission of a BillLJLkSll
counterpart while logic would equally allow a
reading that, without a plain-error *1045 rule, a silent
defendant has no right of review on direct appeal.
Pp. 1049-1050.
(b) Vonn attempts to find support for his reading by
pointing beyond the Rule's text to McCarthy v.
Initial States, 394 I'.S. 459, M S.Ct, flM>. 22
LXd.2d 418-which was decided when Rjiljiii was
relatively primitive-and the developments in that
case's wake culminating in Rule 1 hhVs enactment.
One clearly expressed Rule 1 hh) objective was to
end the practice of reversing automatically for any
Rule 11 error, a practice stemming from reading
McCarthy expansively to require that Unit 52un's
harmless-error provision could not be applied in
Rule- 11 cases. However, McCjinin- had nothing to
do with the choice between harmless-error and plain-
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error review. Nor is there any persuasive reason to
think that when the Advisory Committee and
Congress considered Rule t\(h> they accepted the
view Vonn erroneously attributes to this Court in
H^QiiiilL. The Advisory Committee focused on the
disarray, after .^cCurthw among Courts of Appeals
in treating trivial errors.
The cases cited in the
Committee's Notes cannot reliably be read to suggest
that plain-error review should never apply to Rule. II
errors, when the Notes never made such an assertion
and the cases never mentioned the plainerror/harmless-error distinction.
Rather, the
Committee should be taken at its word that the
harmless-error provision was added because some
courts read McCarthy to require that iiuJiLJiliiil's
general harmless-error provision did not apply to
IliiiiLli proceedings.
The Committee implied
nothing more than it said, and it certainly did not
implicitly repeal Rule 52(b) so far as it might cover a
Rule 11 case. Pp. 1050-1053.
(c) Vonn's position would also have a tendency to
undercut the object of Rule 32(e), which governs
guilty plea withdrawal by creating an incentive to file
withdrawal motions before sentence, not afterward.
This tends to separate meritorious second thoughts
and mere sour grapes over a sentence once
pronounced. But the incentive to think and act early
when Hufc 11 is at stake would prove less substantial
if a defendant could be silent until direct appeal,
when the Government would always have the burden
to prove harmlessness. Pp. 1053-1054.
2. A reviewing court may consult the whole record
when considering the effect of any Rule \ 1 error on
substantial
rights.
The Advisory Committee
intended the error's effect to be assessed on an
existing record, but it did not mean to limit that
record strictly to the plea proceeding, as the Ninth
Circuit did here. McCarthy ostensibly supports that
court's position; but it was decided before Rule
iJiiU w as enacted, and it was not a case with a
record on point. Here, in addition to the transcript of
the plea hearing and Rule II colloquy, the record
shows that Vonn was advised of his right to trial
counsel during his initial appearance and twice at his
first arraignment, and that four times either he or his
counsel affirmed that he had heard or read a
statement of his rights and understood them.
Because there are circumstances in which defendants
may be presumed to recall information provided to
them prior to the plea proceeding, cf. ttoudey v.

( HtUii Mules. 52J i .V f»i4. olS, ! LS N.Q. !olMx

NO N*:d:MJl~<^ the record of Vonn's initial
appearance and arraignments is relevant in fact and
well within the Advisory Committee's understanding
of the record that should be open to consideration.
Since the transcripts of Vonn's first appearance and
arraignment were not presented to the Ninth Circuit,
this Court should not resolve their bearing on his
claim before the Ninth Circuit has done so. Pp.
1054-1055.
J?A.L^d H52- vacated and remanded.
SOI IFR. J., delivered the opinion of the Court,
Part HI of which was unanimous, and Parts I and II
of which were joined by RFHNQt 1ST, C. J., and
O'CONNOR, SCAU.-V, KENNEDY, THOMAS,
CIIYSBURG,
and
BRFVFR,
*1046 ~JJ.
^XE^ E s s , J., filed an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part,po5/, p. 1055.
Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, DC, for the
petitioner.
Monica Knox, Los Angeles, CA, for the respondent.

Justice SOU I E R delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Government avoids reversal of a criminal
conviction by showing that trial error, albeit raised by
a timely objection, affected no substantial right of the
defendant and was thus harmless. Fed. Rule (rim.
Proc. 52(a). A defendant who failed to object to
trial error may nonetheless obtain reversal of a
conviction by carrying the converse burden, showing
among other things that plain error did affect his
substantial rights. Fed. Rule Crim.Proc. 52(b).
Rule 11(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure is a separate harmless-error rule applying
only to errors committed under Ru.ie.JJ., the rule
meant to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and
voluntary, by laying out the steps a trial judge must
take before accepting such a plea. Like Ryiej^iiQ,
it provides that a failure to comply with Rule 11 that
"does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded." RMt-iiiiU does not include a plainerror provision comparable to Ru|e j^2db>.
HI The first question here is whether a defendant
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who lets ^ i ^ J i error pass without objection in the
trial court must carry the burdens of RuRJL~l£i or
whether even the silent defendant can put the
Government to the burden of proving the R|iN: J t
error harmless. J L O l l
The second question is
whether a court reviewing K_u[eJJ. error under either
standard is limited to examining the record of the
colloquy between court and defendant when the
guilty plea was entered, or may look to the entire
record begun at the defendant's first appearance in
the matter leading to his eventual plea.

JL2LL Trus question is rightly before us even
though the Government did not urge the
Court of Appeals to adopt a plain-error
standard.
As the Court of Appeals
recognized, 224 f.Mi 1132, 1135 (C..-V.<>
ii?fflii» m * s position was squarely barred by
Circuit precedent holding that any Rule [\
error is subject to harmless-error review.
United States \\ Odcdo, 134 \\M 937, 940
((.v.*) t(>Q8). Although the Government
did not challenge Odedo as controlling
precedent, we have previously held that
such a claim is preserved if made by the
current litigant in "the recent proceeding
upon which the lower courts relied for their
resolution of the issue, and [the litigant] did
not concede in the current case the
correctness of that precedent."
United
States v. t+ifliams. 504 U.S. 36, 44-45. 112
SXL
1735, MS L.Ed.2d 352 j1M<>2).
Although there evidently was some
confusion as to the Government's precise
position in Odeda, presumably because the
Government argued there, as here, that
failure to raise a Rule 11 objection
constitutes "waiver," the Court of Appeals
understood the Government to contend that
"forfeited error" is subject to plain-error
review. That, coupled with the fact that the
Government did not concede below that
Odedo was correctly decided, is enough for
us to take up this question.

We hold that a silent defendant has the burden to
satisfy the plain- error rule and that a reviewing court
may consult the whole record when considering the
effect of any error on substantial rights.

I
On February 28, 1997, respondent Alphonso Vonn
was charged with armed bank robbery, under |_S_
* .S.C, §§ >H3la) JHU hh, and using and carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence,
under L^Jiv!-i!<....§ .5.?iu:i- Vonn appeared that day
before a Magistrate Judge, who advised him of his
constitutional rights, including "the right to retain and
to be represented by an attorney of [his] own
choosing at each and every sta[g]e of *1047 the
proceedings." App. 15. Vonn said that he had
heard and understood his rights, and the judge
appointed counsel to represent him.
On March 17, 1997, three days after being indicted,
Vonn, along with his appointed counsel, appeared in
court for his arraignment.
Again, the Magistrate
Judge told Vonn about his rights, including the right
to counsel at all stages of the proceedings. Vonn's
counsel gave the court a form entitled "Statement of
Defendant's Constitutional Rights," on which Vonn
said he understood his rights, including the right to
counsel. His counsel signed a separate statement
that he was satisfied that Vonn had read and
understood the statement of his rights. The Clerk of
Court then asked Vonn whether he had heard and
understood the court's explanation of his rights, and
whether he had read and signed the statement, and
Vonn said yes to each question.
On May 12, 1997, Vonn came before the court and
indicated that he would plead guilty to armed bank
robbery but would go to trial on the firearm charge.
The court then addressed him and, up to a point,
followed Rule 1 l(cK3), of .the Feelers 1 _rRules^aL
Criminal Procedure. The judge advised Vonn of
the constitutional rights he would relinquish by
pleading guilty, but skipped the required advice that
if Vonn were tried he would have "the right to the
assistance of counsel."
Several months later, the stakes went up when the
grand jury returned a superseding indictment,
charging Vonn under an additional count of
conspiracy to commit bank robbery. Although he
first pleaded not guilty to this charge as well as the
firearm count, at a hearing on September 3, 1997,
Vonn said he intended to change both pleas to guilty.
Again, the court advised Vonn of rights waived by
guilty pleas, but failed to mention the right to counsel
if he went to trial. This time, the prosecutor tried to
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draw the court's attention to its error, saying that she
did not "remember hearing the Court inform the
defendant of his right to assistance of counsel." Id.,
at 61. The court, however, may have mistaken the
remark as going to Huh: iHni2), and answered
simply that Vonn was represented by counsel, f iT
' M 2j

L3i. fillkJJUtliii provides that "if the
defendant is not represented by an attorney,"
the court must inform the defendant that he
"has the right to be represented by an
attorney at every stage of the proceeding
and, if necessary, one will be appointed to
represent [him]."

Eight months later, Vonn moved to withdraw his
guilty plea on the firearm charge.
He did not,
however, cite IiMJiLii en"Or D u t instead based his
request on his own mistake about facts relevant to the
charge. The court denied this motion, and on June
22, 1998, sentenced Vonn to 97 months in prison.
On appeal, Vonn sought to set aside not only the
firearm conviction but the other two as well, for the
first time making an issue of the District Judge's
failure to advise him of his right to counsel at trial, as
required by the Rule. The Court of Appeals agreed
there had been error, and held that Vonn's failure to
object before the District Court to its Kule 11
omission was of no import, since Rule 11(h)
"supersedes the normal waiver rule," and subjects all
itilk-JLi violations to harmless-error review, 224
L M J I i L i155 iC..\.*> 2000) (citing I ruled States
?T ( » , 154 i'Jd 037 (C.A.V 1M08)).
The
consequence was to put the Government to the
burden of showing no effect on substantial rights.^
L O I i The c o u r t declined to "go beyond the plea
proceeding in considering whether the defendant was
aware of his rights," and did not accept the record of
Vonn's plea colloquies as evidence that Vonn was
aware of *1048 his continuing right to counsel at
trial. 224 l-JtL at 1155> It held the Government
had failed to shoulder its burden to show the error
harmless and vacated Vonn's convictions.

Ly.lt As already noted, n. 1, supra, the
Government in this case did not specifically
argue that the plain-error rule, Rnle 52(b),
governs this case; that was its position in

Q^iItli-^lJllii^L^2: o n which the Court of
Appeals relied for authority here. Hence,
the Court of Appeals in this case went no
further than to reject the Government's
waiver argument.

!2I v O .
We granted certiorari, 53 L.l..:S._J±
1185, 140 L.F.d.2ri 102 <200i u to resolve conflicts
among the Circuits on the legitimacy of (1) placing
the burden of plain error on a defendant appealing on
the basis of Bl!i£JLi e r r o r raised for the first time on
appeal,JjnS4| and (2) looking beyond the plea
colloquy to other parts of the official record to see
whether a defendant's substantial rights were affected
by a deviation from Rule \ I. JFN5J We think the
Court of Appeals was mistaken on each issue, and
vacate and remand.

\-M. Compare, e.g., 224 K3d. a* 1155
(case below); t rated Stales r. Lyons, 5}
F.3d 132h 1322, \7.\ (( X D X J00?>7with
I nited States v. (tainfia-MaYsotiet* 227
1.3d I, 5-6 jCA.l 20QQ); (nited Suites w
Basftum. 2~ l\Mt 1174, 1178 (CA.6 1904);
(nhed States r. Cross. 5 7 P.3d 588, 590
(C.A.7 1905*;
and (fitted States y.
Quhwnes. 91 F.3d 473. 475 (C.A. 11 1 0(NQ.

\Mt at 1155.
L*2i Compare, e.g.
with (nited States v. Parkin >; 25 I 3d 114,
UX (C.A.2 W 4 ) ;
Vnited States v.
Johnson. ! l-\3d 2 % . 302 «V.A.5 ! W ) ;
Luiu >d States v. Lavett. 844 !=\2d 48 7 , 402
rc.A 1 1 *>88>; I nited States V. Jotti v. 143
1417, 1420 s C.A. 11 . w>8j;
t\M
and

Lyons, supra. ;it 1322-1323.

Rule II of the l-Vderal R.M!cs.. ot\/J.rhnMiiil
Procedure requires a judge to address a defendant
about to enter a plea of guilty, to ensure that he
understands the law of his crime in relation to the
facts of his case, as well as his rights as a criminal
defendant. The Rule has evolved over the course of
30 years from general scheme to detailed plan, which
now includes a provision for dealing with a slip-up
by the judge in applying the Rule itself. Subsection
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(h) reads that "[ajny variance from the procedures
required by this rule which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded.'1 The language comes
close to tracking the text of ByijijL~UL!> providing
generally for "harmless-error" review, that is,
consideration of error raised by a defendant's timely
objection, but subject to an opportunity on the
Government's part to carry the burden of showing
that any error was harmless, as having no effect on
the defendant's substantial rights. See Fed. Rule
£.fOILJ>n>£v.?.?M). ("Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall
be disregarded"); Cnned Stuns r. O/a/w, ,507 X]*S,

EMlLJ51ili» however, has a companion in Rui€
22i^h a "plain-error" rule covering issues not raised
before the district court in a timely way: "Plain
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the court." When an appellate court
considers error that qualifies as plain, the tables are
turned on demonstrating the substantiality of any
effect on a defendant's rights: the defendant who sat
silent at trial has the burden to show that his
"substantial rights" were affected. /</.. 507 ILS.. at
734~"35, H3 SAX 1770. And because relief on
plain-error review is in the discretion of the
reviewing court, a defendant has the further burden
to persuade the court that the error " 'seriously affect
[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.' " M, at 736. 113 SAX 1770
(quoting j-nned States r. Atkinson, 207 L.S. \$^.
\t*h 5f. S.Cr. 301, 80 L.fcd. 555 (1936)).
The question here is whether Congress's importation
of the harmless-error standard into Role 11(h)
without its companion plain-error rule was meant to
eliminate a silent defendant's burdens under the Rule
f1X.l plain-error review, and instead give him a right
to subject the Government to the burden of
demonstrating harmlessness. If the answer is yes, a
defendant loses nothing by failing to object to
obvious liMJllJUL error when it occurs. We think the
answer is no.
*1049A
Vonn's most obvious recourse is to argue from the
text itself: RuieJ Uh) unequivocally provides that a
trial judge's "variance" from the letter of the Rule 11
scheme shall be disregarded if it does not affect

substantial rights, the classic shorthand formulation
of the harmless-error standard.
It includes no
exception for nonobjecting defendants.
[31 Despite this unqualified simplicity, however,
Vonn does not argue that H u h \J_ error must always
be reviewed on the 11(h) standard, with its burden on
the Government to show an error harmless. Even
though Rule- \Uh) makes no distinction between
direct and collateral review, Vonn does not claim
even that the variant of harmless-error review
applicable on collateral attack, see Sn^.hr r,
ibruham*ottt SiH I ..V MO, 638. IJ 3 S.( t. P H J .
123 L.KcUri 353 HW3>. would apply wherT
evaluating Rule 11 error on habeas review. Rather,
he concedes that the adoption of 11(h) had no effect
on the stringent standard for collateral review of
BJllLll error under 28 r.S.l . § 2255 i W 4 ed.), as
established by our holding in (^!itf^L..SlilI£L Hu
TituMn'ck, 441 l.-.S. 780, 0«> >AX 2085.frOL.r.d.M
o$4 HO?1?), that a defendant cannot overturn a guilty
plea on collateral review absent a showing that the
Rule 11 proceeding was " 'inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of fair procedure' " or
constituted a " 'complete miscarriage of justice,'" ijL^
at 783, 00 SAX 2085 (quoting /-//// v. United States,
368 U.S. 424> 428, 82 SAX 468. 7 iTKcTld ~417
(l%2)).
The concession is prudent, for the
Advisory Committee Notes explaining the adoption
°f Rttle *Hh) speak to a clear intent to leave
Tim wreck undisturbed, LOld ^ d there is no
question of Timmn-cfi1^ validity in the aftermath of
the 1983 amendments.
Ih*L m m e absence of a clear legislative
mandate, the Advisory Committee Notes
provide a reliable source of insight into the
meaning of a rule, especially when, as here,
the rule was enacted precisely as the
Advisory Committee proposed. See i^xli.
•Mr cm ft Corp. v. Rulney, 4H8 l-.S. iS}^ <65166, n. *>, 100 SAX. 43<h 102 IJ-iUd 445
(1088) (where "Congress did not amend the
Advisory Committee's draft in any way ...
the Committee's commentary is particularly
relevant in determining the meaning of the
document Congress enacted"). Although
the Notes are the product of the Advisory
Committee, and not Congress, they are
transmitted to Congress before the rule is
enacted into law.
See Amendments to
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Rules of Criminal Procedure, H.R. Doc. No.
98-55 (1983) (submitting to Congress
amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, including the addition
of Ruk 1 Uht, accompanied by the report of
the Judicial Conference containing the
Advisory Committee Notes to the
amendment).

Whatever may be the significance of the text of Rujl
tlilii f° r o u r issue, then, it cannot be as simple as the
face of the provision itself. Indeed, the closest Vonn
gets to a persuasive argument that Rule U excuses a
silent defendant from the burdens of plain-error
review is his invocation of the common interpretive
canon for dealing with a salient omission from
statutory text. He claims that the specification of
harmless-error review in 11(h) shows an intent to
exclude the standard with which harmless error is
paired in Rute 52, the plain-error standard with its
burdens on silent defendants. The congressional
choice to express the one standard of review without
its customary companion does not, however, speak
with any clarity in Vonn's favor.
14j)5) At best, as we have said before, the canon that
expressing one item of a commonly associated group
or series excludes another left unmentioned is only a
guide, whose fallibility can be shown by contrary
indications that adopting a particular rule or statute
was probably not meant to signal any exclusion of its
common relatives.
See Pauley y. BethEnergy
U/Ws. Inc.. 501 l.S. 680, 703. \\\ S X t 2524, 115
LJ:;<Ud 604 ( W h ; cf Burns w I>//;<></ Sums,
50tT.S. \1<K \M>~\\\ S.O."2182, MS f..i:<i.id 123
(iiH>[) ("An inference drawn from congressional
silence certainly cannot be credited when it is
contrary to all other textual and contextual *1050
evidence of congressional intent").
Here, the
plausibility of an expression-exclusion reading of
BM.lt? IIjh\ is subject to one strike without even
considering what such a reading would mean in
practice, or examining the circumstances of adopting
11(h).
For here the harmless- and plain-error
alternatives are associated together in the formally
enacted Rule 52, having apparently equal dignity
w tn
* JiiiilliiiiOf a n d applying by its terms to error in
the application of any other Rule of criminal
procedure. To hold that the terms of Biid*LJL!iLu
imply that the latter half of Rule 52 has no
application to Riijc U errors would consequently

amount to finding a partial repeal of U^H ^ ^ by
implication, a result sufficiently
disfavored,
as t0

i..^i.i:LL..I?iLL^^
strong support.

require

Support, however, is not readily found. In the first
place, even if we indulge Vonn with the assumption
that Congress meant to imply something by failing to
pair a plain-error provision with the harmless-error
statement in JiML.lIi!l2> just what it would have
meant is subject to argument.
Vonn thinks the
implication is that defendants who let Ij^JLJJ.. e r r o r
pass without objection are relieved of the burden on
silent defendants generally under the plain-error rule,
to show the error plain, prejudicial, and disreputable
to the judicial system. But, of course, this is not the
only "implication" consistent with Congress's choice
to say nothing about Rule 11 plain error. It would
be equally possible, as a matter of logic, to argue that
if !ild.Li2lM w e r e implicitly made inapplicable to
Rule 11 errors, a defendant who failed to object to
Rmc 11 errors would have no right of review on
direct appeal whatever.
A defendant's right to
review of error he let pass in silence depends upon
the plain-error rule; no plain-error rule, no direct
review.
Vonn has, then, merely selected one
possible interpretation of the supposedly intentional
omission of a Rule 52(h) counterpart, even though
logic would equally allow another one, not to Vonn's
liking.
B
Recognition of the equivocal character of any
claimed implication of speaking solely in terms of
harmless error forces Vonn to look beyond the text in
hope of finding confirmation for his reading as
opposed to the one less hospitable to silent
defendants.
And this effort leads him to claim
support in WeOmhy wJ/mtetf States. 3*U j.-.S. 45*).
m S X t 1166, 22T.Kd.2d J l F f l ^ ' ) , and the
developments in the wake of that case culminating in
the enactment of \iw\e 1 HI*?. This approach, at
least, gets us on the right track, for the one clearly
expressed objective of Ruk... UCh.) was to end the
practice, then commonly followed, of reversing
automatically for any Uuk i l error, and that practice
stemmed from an expansive reading of Msii'^jltli
What that case did, and did not, hold is therefore
significant.
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When H; 1 liiii w a s decided, JI.MI: I ; was
relatively primitive, requiring without much detail
that the trial court personally address a defendant
proposing to plead guilty and establish on the record
that he was acting voluntarily, with an understanding
of the charge and upon a factual basis supporting
conviction. U:Jjit iiiiJ^i^^^Q:„Lii^l;J£X•ll When
McCarthy stood before the District Court to plead
guilty to tax evasion, however, the judge's colloquy
with him went no further than McCarthy's
understanding of his right to a jury trial, the
particular sentencing possibilities, and the *1051
absence of any threats or promises. There was no
discussion of the elements of the crime charged, or
the facts that might support it. Indeed, despite the
allegation that McCarthy had acted "willfully and
knowingly," his lawyer consistently argued at the
sentencing hearing that his client had merely been
neglectful, wni^ Although defense counsel raised no
objection to the trial court's deficient practice under
Milk...Li. this Court reversed the conviction on direct
review. The Court rested the result solely on the
trial judge's obvious failure to conform to the Rule,
uL -At 464, $l> S.Ct, 1166, and emphasized that the
Rule's procedural safeguards served important
constitutional
interests in guarding against
inadvertent and ignorant waivers of constitutional
rights, M.t uc 465, 89 S.Ct. 1166. Although the
Government asked to have the case remanded for
further evidentiary hearing and an opportunity to
show that McCarthy's plea had been made knowingly
and voluntarily, the Court said no and ordered the
plea and resulting conviction vacated.
r:A7, Prior to its amendment in 1975, Rule
11 provided, in relevant part:
"The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a
plea of nolo contendere without first
addressing the defendant personally and
determining that the plea is made voluntarily
with understanding of the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea. ...
The court shall not enter a judgment upon a
plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there
is a factual basis for the plea."

Vonn does not, of course, claim that MyC.ftjj.hy. n e ^
that a silent defendant had no plain-error burden, but
he says that this must have been the Court's

understanding, or it would have taken McCarthy's
failure to object to the trial judge's kuk; JJ failings,
combined with his failure to meet the requirements of
the plain-error rule, as a bar to relief. This reasoning
is unsound, however, for two reasons, the first being
that not a word was said in ^cLiiUlll about the plainerror rule, or for that matter about harmless error.
The opinion said nothing about R»i iojy_ or either of
the rules by name. The parties' briefs said nothing.
The only serious issue was raised by the
Government's request to remand the case for a new
evidentiary hearing on McCarthy's state of mind
when he entered the plea, and not even this had
anything to do with either the harmless-- or plainerror rule.
Under the former, the Government's
opportunity and burden is to show the error harmless
based on the entire record before the reviewing court,
see l nih'd Staff* v. I fasting* 461 t.'.S, I1-***, 3U^ n>

7, 103 ?>,Q. 1MM, ?6 !...fcd.2d % (1W0»; under the
plain-error rule the Government likewise points to
parts of the record to counter any ostensible showing
of prejudice the defendant may make, see / WJW.
States >'. >/j//«g, 470 t . S . K 16, 103 S.Ct. 1038, 84
L,1J.:<1 1 ih>H5).
Under either rule, the
Government's opportunity is to persuade with what it
has, not to initiate further litigation.
Yet further
litigation is what the Government wanted in
McCarthy. It argued that if the Court did not think
that the existing record demonstrated that McCarthy's
plea had been knowing and voluntary, the Court
should remand for a further hearing with new
evidence affirmatively making this showing, 364_
t.S„ i\t 46*J> 8<* S.Ct. 1166. When the Court said
no, it made no reference to harmless or plain error,
but cited the object of Ru]<LJLi t 0 eliminate timewasting litigation after the fact about how knowing
and voluntary a defendant really had been at an
earlier hearing, hi., at 46*M7(K 8*> S.Ct, ! 166, And
it expressed intense skepticism that any defendant
would succeed, no matter how little he understood,
once the evidence at a subsequent hearing showed
that he had desired to plead, hi.* M 46*>, 8*) S.Ct.
! 16<>. In sum, McCarthy had nothing to do with the
choice between harmless-error and plain-error
review; the issue was simply whether the
Government could extend the litigation for additional
evidence.
Vonn's attempt to read the MyCiSiiii Court's mind is
therefore purely speculative.
What is worse,
however, his speculation is less plausible than the
view that the Court would probably have held that
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McCarthy satisfied the plain-error burdens if that had
mattered. There was no question that the trial judge
had failed to observe HiiHLJj, and the failing was
obvious.
So was the prejudice to McCarthy.
Having had no explanation from the judge of the
knowing and willful state of mind charged as of the
time of the tax violation, *1052 he pleaded guilty and
was later sentenced at a hearing in which his lawyer
repeatedly represented that McCarthy had been guilty
of nothing but sloppiness. JJKNjli The contradiction
between the plea and the denial of the mental state
alleged bespoke the prejudice of an unknowing plea,
to which the judge's indifference was an affront to
the integrity of the judicial system. While we need
not relitigate or rewrite McCarthy at this point, it is
safe to say that the actual opinion is not even
speculative authority that the plain-error rule stops
short of Rjije }± errors.

FVK. Nor did McCarthy claim that the
guilty plea should be accepted on the cll£vnl
theory that a defendant may plead guilty
while protesting innocence when he makes a
conscious choice to plead simply to avoid
the expenses or vicissitudes of trial. Xogii.
Carolina v. Afford, 400 U.S. 25. K>\ S.O.

Nor is there any persuasive reason to think that when
the Advisory Committee and Congress later came to
consider Rule 11(h) they accepted the view Vonn
erroneously attributes to this Court in McCarthy.
The attention of the Advisory Committee to the
problem of Rule U error was not drawn by
±i<:ij?il!l£ so much as by events that subsequently
invested that case with a significance beyond its
holding. In 1975, a few years after McCarthy came
down, Congress transformed Riik* 11 into a detailed
formula for testing a defendant's readiness to proceed
to enter a plea of guilty, obliging the judge to give
specified advice about the charge, the applicable
criminal statute, and even collateral law. The Court
in IkiJUlhl. na< i, for example, been content to say
that a defendant would need to know of the right
against self- incrimination and rights to jury trial and
confrontation before he could knowingly plead. But
the 1975 revision of Rule \ 1 required instruction on
such further matters as cross-examination in addition
to confrontation, see Fed. Rule Cv\m.?y$>Li.
I ••
; the right to counsel "at... trial" even when

the defendant stood in court with a lawyer next to
him (as in this case), see u^t,
and even the
consequences of any perjury the defendant might
commit at the plea hearing, see MiliL-JJ-LLi^JAlthough the details newly required in Ruk [j
colloquies did not necessarily equate to the
importance of the overarching issues of knowledge
and voluntariness already addressed in the earlier
versions of the Rule, some Courts of Appeals felt
bound to treat all Kj^ijj, lapses as equal and to read
McCarthy as mandating automatic reversal for any
one of them. See Advisory Committee's Notes on
1983 Amendments to Fed. Rule ( rim. Proc. \\. IK
LS.C.App., r>> !$(>$ (hereinafter Advisory
Committee's Notes) (citing Cniwd States v. tloonc,
543 Y.li\ 1UW (C >\A 1*)7<»; Cnited States v.
Jvuntct. 544 K2d 633 K\.V2 1M?<»).
This
approach imposed a cost on Rule H mistakes that
H^iJUihl neither required nor justified, and by 1983
the practice of automatic reversal for error
threatening little prejudice to a defendant or disgrace
to the legal system prompted further revision of Ruk\
JM. Advisory Committee's Notes 1568.
The Advisory Committee reasoned that, although a
rule of per se reversal might have been justified at
the time McCarthy was decided, "[a]n inevitable
consequence of the 1975 amendments was some
increase in the risk that a trial judge, in a particular
case, might inadvertently deviate to some degree
from the procedure which a very literal reading of
Rule 1 j would appear to require."
Advisory
Committee's Notes 1568. After the amendments, "it
became more apparent than ever that Rule J3, should
not be given such a crabbed interpretation that
ceremony was exalted over substance." I hut.
Vonn thinks the Advisory Committee's report also
includes a signal that it meant to dispense with a
silent defendant's plain-error burdens. He stresses
that the report cited Courts of Appeals cases of
"crabbed interpretation" that had given *1053 relief
to nonobjecting defendants. By proposing only a
harmless-error amendment to correct the mistakes
made in these cases, he says, the Committee must
have thought that the Government's only answer to
nonobjecting defendants should be to prove error
harmless, if it could. But this argument ignores the
fact that these cases were not merely instances of
automatic reversal, but were cited along with
harmless-error cases as illustrations of the
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"considerable disagreement" that arose after
i/-. « >
among Courts of Appeals in treating
errors of trivial significance.
See Advisory
Committee's Notes 1568.
Given the Advisory
Committee's apparent focus on the disarray among
courts, the citations Vonn points to cannot reliably be
read to suggest that plain-error review should never
apply to K?*k: ?J errors, when the Advisory
Committee Notes never made such an assertion and
the reported cases cited by the Committee never
mentioned the plain-error/harmless-error distinction.
We think, rather, that the significance of Congress's
choice to adopt a harmless-error rule is best
understood by taking the Advisory Committee at its
word. "It must ... be emphasized that a harmless
error provision has been added to Rate II because
some courts have read McCarthy as meaning that the
general harmless error provision in Rule 52(a)
cannot be utilized with respect to J£uj£. LI
proceedings." Id., at 1569. The Committee said it
was responding simply to a claim that the harmlesserror rule did not apply. Having pinpointed that
problem, it gave a pinpoint answer. If instead the
Committee had taken note of claims that "Rule 52"
did not apply, or that "neither harmless-error nor
plain-error rule applied," one could infer that
enacting a harmless-error rule and nothing more was
meant to rule out anything but harmless-error
treatment.
But by providing for harmless-error
review in response to nothing more than the claim
that harmless-error review would itself be erroneous,
the Advisory Committee implied nothing more than it
said, and it certainly did not implicitly repeal R»U\
5liiii so far as it might cover a Rule H case.
C
A further reason to doubt that Congress could have
intended Vonn's position is the tendency it would
have to undercut the object of Rule 32(e), which
governs withdrawing a plea of guilty by creating an
incentive to file withdrawal motions before sentence,
not afterward. A trial judge is authorized to grant
such a presentence motion if the defendant carries the
burden of showing a "fair and just reason" for
withdrawal, and a defendant who fails to move for
withdrawal before sentencing has no further recourse
except "direct appeal or ... motion under 28 IJ.S.iV.
ZJl V' subject to the rules covering those later stages.
LsiL. i* b! * i r l n i -..J*L*KiJUj£}'
Whatever the "fair
and just" standard may require on presentence

motions, J{• VM the Advisory Committee Notes
confirm the textual suggestion that the Rule creates a
" "near- presumption' " against granting motions filed
after sentencing, Advisory Committee's Notes on
1983 Amendment to Ll^- lljjl^illl^ • ?V;i*'- - l - ^
* 'X-CMW.v P.> JS}~1 (quoting ijjjKjL^i*!*-!! L.
gi/r/ur. 514 f .Id 1\% 2\*} A ...VIM J- ; T^). This
is only good sense; in acting as an incentive to think
through a guilty plea before sentence is imposed, the
Rule tends to separate meritorious second thoughts
(say, a defendant's doubts about his understanding)
and mere sour grapes over a sentence once
pronounced. The "near-presumption" concentrates
plea litigation in the *1054 trial courts, where
genuine mistakes can be corrected easily, and
promotes the finality required in a system as heavily
dependent on guilty pleas as ours.

rM*. The Courts of Appeals have held that
a Rule 11 violation that is harmless under
Rule liilll does not rise to the level of a
"fair and just reason" for withdrawing a
guilty plea. See I titn;.if,nMtn£s. v. p/v'tvj;,
llLLdlLZfiLJ7i!?U<^ijiLl(I(LU ("Even an
established violation of Riile f I can be
harmless error ... and thus not a 'fair and just
reason' to return to Square One"); LiiiL^L
$IM£1Z-J»^

LL±J..L

li>%); (.-,[nfnvf Stales %„ Mamtiez-ihMhtih

But the incentive to think and act early when R.uje_
H is at stake would prove less substantial if Vonn's
position were law; a defendant could choose to say
nothing about a judge's plain lapse under R.ujc ! ]
until the moment of taking a direct appeal, at which
time the burden would always fall on the
Government to prove harmlessness. A defendant
could simply relax and wait to see if the sentence
later struck him as satisfactory; if not, his Rule I [
silence would have left him with clear but
uncorrected Ruk- 11 error to place on the
Government's shoulders. This result might, perhaps,
be sufferable if there were merit in Vonn's objection
that applying the plain- error standard to a defendant
who stays mum on liideJJ e r r o r invites the judge to
relax. The plain-error rule, he says, would discount
the judge's duty to advise the defendant by obliging
the defendant to advise the judge. But, rhetoric aside,
that is always the point of the plain-error rule: the
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value of finality requires defense counsel to be on his
toes, not just the judge, and the defendant who just
sits there when a mistake can be fixed cannot just sit
there when he speaks up later on. |f Mj|]

-j Contrary to Justice STEVENS's
suggestion, post, at 1057-1058 (opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part)
there is nothing
"perverse" about
conditioning the Government's harmlesserror burden on an objection when the judge
commits Uute 11 error. A defendant's right
to counsel on entering a guilty plea is
expressly recognized in Rate I l(c)(2j, and
counsel is obliged to understand the Kujejj.
requirements.
It is fair to burden the
defendant with his lawyer's obligation to do
what is reasonably necessary to render the
guilty plea effectual and to refrain from
trifling with the court. It therefore makes
sense to require counsel to call a Rule 1 f
failing to the court's attention.
It is
perfectly true that an uncounseled defendant
may not, in fact, know enough to spot a
Hnte M error, but when a defendant
chooses self-representation after a warning
from the court of the perils this entails, see
Htretui v. California, 422 U.S. 806. 835, 95
S,U.- 2525, 43 L.KcUd 562 <197Sj. Rule
\\ silence is one of the perils he assumes.
Any other approach is at odds with
Congress's object in adopting Rule II,
recognized in McCarthy v. I nited States,
y>i CS. 459, 465, 89 S.O. 1166. 22
J.,K(L2d 4)H (l*w>), to combat defendants'
"often frivolous" attacks on the validity of
their guilty pleas, by aiding the district judge
in determining whether the defendant's plea
was knowing and voluntary and creating a
record at the time of the plea supporting that
decision.
Vonn's final retort that application of the
plain-error rule would tend to leave some
"unconstitutional
pleas"
uncorrected
obviates the question in this case, which is
who bears the burden of proving that KHJJL
h error did or did not prejudice the
defendant:
the Government or the
defendant?

In sum, there are good reasons to doubt that
expressing a harmless- error standard in Rnu- \\>h\
was meant to carry any implication beyond its terms.
At the very least, there is no reason persuasive
enough to think 11(h) was intended to repeal Jii!iL.
52y*>> for every KultLii case.
Ill
(6[ The final question goes to the scope of an
appellate court's enquiry into the effect of a ilulr 11
violation, whatever the review, plain error or
harmless. The Court of Appeals confined itself to
considering the record of "the plea proceeding," 124
Liik_..£i JJjL^.: applying Circuit precedent
recognizing that the best evidence of a defendant's
understanding when pleading guilty is the colloquy
closest to the moment he enters the plea. While
there is no doubt that this position serves the object
of Rule 11 to eliminate wasteful post hoc probes into
a defendant's psyche, WcCarthw MU i >S.> at 4TIL
81) S.O. 1166, the Court of Appeals was more
zealous than the policy behind the Rule demands.
The Advisory Committee intended the effect of error
to be assessed on an existing record, no question, but
it did not mean to limit that record strictly to the plea
proceedings: the enquiry " 'must be resolved solely
on the basis of the Rule J J. transcript' and the other
portions (e.g., sentencing hearing) of the limited
record *1055 made in such cases." Advisory
Committee's Notes 1569 (quoting C nited States \\
Coronado, 554 1.2d Ifro, 1?0fc n, 5 K .A.5 U>7"Q.
True, language in McCarthy ostensibly supports the
position taken by the Court of Appeals (which did
not, however, rest on it); we admonished that
"[t]here is no adequate substitute for demonstrating
in the record at the time the plea is entered the
defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge
against him," 3jM (:.S., ar 4"U, 89 S.C i. \ I6<>
(emphasis in original). But McCarthy was decided
before the enactment of Ruit i hli), which came with
the commentary just quoted, and McCarthy in any
event was not a case with a record of anything on
point, even outside the RjiitL.il hearing.
The
Government responded to the laconic plea colloquy
not by referring to anything illuminating in the
record; instead it brought up the indictment, tried to
draw speculative inferences from conversations
McCarthy probably had with his lawyer, and sought
to present new evidence.
The only serious
alternative to "the record at the time the plea [was]
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entered" was an evidentiary hearing for further
factfinding by the trial court.
Here, however, there is a third source of
information, outside the four corners of the transcript
of the plea hearing and &KW J J colloquy, but still
part of the record.
Transcripts brought to our
attention show that Vonn was advised of his right to
trial counsel during his initial appearance before the
Magistrate Judge and twice at his first arraignment.
The record shows that four times either Vonn or his
counsel affirmed that Vonn had heard or read a
statement of his rights and understood what they
were.
Because there are circumstances in which
defendants may be presumed to recall information
provided to them prior to the plea proceeding, cf.
fhHistt'Y v. f-tnk'tf Sniffs, 5Z3 I..S. ft 14, H 8 , 118
S.Ct.- n>04. 140 i . J u U d S28 (f*>98) (a defendant
with a copy of his indictment before pleading guilty
is presumed to know the nature of the charge against
him), the record of Vonn's initial appearance and
arraignment is relevant in fact, and well within the
Advisory Committee's understanding of "other
portions ... of the limited record" that should be open
to consideration. It may be considered here.
The transcripts covering Vonn's first appearance and
arraignment were not, however, presented to the
Court of Appeals. Probably owing to that court's
self-confinement to a narrower record, it made no
express ruling on the part of the Government's
rehearing motion requesting to make the firstappearance and arraignment transcripts part of the
appellate record.
For that reason, even with the
transcripts now in the parties' joint appendix filed
with us, we should not resolve their bearing on
Vonn's claim before the Court of Appeals has done
SO. AisiiT'ittiil (.*vn*tmct<irs. fnc. v. Mhu-tn. 5M jj.S,
103. 122 S.Ct. 511, 151-L.Kd.2d 439(200!)We therefore vacate the Court of Appeals's judgment
and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
// is so ordered.

Justice % It \ O s , concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
For the reasons stated in Part III of the Court's

opinion, I agree that the effect of a violation of - <;M
;l

•*£.jj.H'... t * ^ l ^ j ' ; y

B<Kv> .'•* *• ::-"^:)--

• —

-'hnv

should be evaluated on the basis of the entire record,
rather than just the record of the plea colloquy, and
that a remand is therefore required. Contrary to the
Court's analysis in Part II of its opinion, however, I
am firmly convinced that the history, the text of fc*»k*J, and the special office of the Rule all support the
conclusion, "urged by the Government" in cLldHli}:..
22 i...r.iUd 418 H ^ t h , that the burden of
demonstrating that a violation of that Rule is
harmless is "place [d] upon the Government," >frjjj:
*1056 In }iciAi:!llXi a f t e r deciding that the trial
judge had not complied with \ln\^ H_, the Court had
to "determine the effect of that noncompliance, an
issue that ha[d] engendered a sharp difference ...
among the courts of appeals." /?A ;§r f'^< J s - M ?
Liill
The two alternatives considered by those
courts were the automatic reversal rule that we
ultimately unanimously endorsed in */*.-( 'arrhy and
the harmless-error rule urged by the Government.
jl-'M 1 No one even argued that the defendant should
have the burden of proving prejudice. |j;JNJi The
Court's conclusion that "prejudice inheres in a failure
to comply with Ruk- 11" was uncontroversial. J IN j j
A/.,ar 471,80 S.Ct. \\M>.

L-iL McCarthy was decided 15 years after
the adoption of Elik.2:A> a n d v e t neither the
parties nor the Court discussed the
application of that Rule despite the fact that
the defendant had failed to object to the
Rule 11 error.

KN2. Nor did the Government make such an
argument in the Court of Appeals in this
case. That should be a sufficient reason for
refusing to consider the argument here, see
M , " l l 2 S.O> IT.VS, V*H L.EiUd 352
(1<>92) (STEVENS, J., dissenting), but, as in
}Mljoi*Z!i* t n e Court finds it appropriate to
accord "a special privilege for the Federal
Government," Mr.-»....lLi.:-.-: lil^LLJJM.:.
hiih "We thus conclude that prejudice
inheres in a failure to comply with Upu U,
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for noncompliance deprives the defendant of
the Rule's procedural safeguards that are
designed to facilitate a more accurate
determination of the voluntariness of his
P lea-" M<:C'itrfhr >-, i'nited Sin a -v. W t ..S,
l!Aiil'l?5i- Not a word in the proceedings
that led to the amendment rejecting the
automatic reversal remedy questioned the
validity of the proposition that every
violation of the Rule is presumptively
prejudicial. The amendment merely gives
the Government the opportunity to
overcome that presumption.

During the years preceding the 1983 amendment to
Ruk 11, it was generally understood that
noncompliance with Ruk i 1 in direct appeal cases
required automatic reversal.
See Advisory
Committee's Notes on 1983 Amendments to jH>yL
Rule Crim.- IVoy. U, \H IJ.S.C/..-\|HJ.» n. (5t>8
(hereinafter Advisory Committee's Notes) (citing
I'ttited States v. Hootu\ 543 F.2d MNO tC.A.4
!M7<>'
i fined States w Jaurncu 544 1.2(1 (>*J
(CA.2 V)l<>\). Thus, prior to the addition of Kale
I lihh neither plain-error .LOU n o r harmless- error
review applied to Rule II violations.
Rejecting
Msi£jElhLl "extreme sanction of automatic reversal"
for technical violations, Congress added subsection
11(h), which closely tracks the harmless-error
language of Rule 52(a). jFNSj
Advisory
Committee's Notes 1569.
As the Advisory
Committee's Notes make clear, "Subdivision (h)
makes no change in the responsibilities of the judge
at
K»l*- 1 - proceedings, but instead merely rejects the
extreme sanction of automatic reversal." Ibid,
(emphasis deleted and added). The plain text thus
embodies Congress' choice of incorporating the
standard found in Rule 52(a), while omitting that of
Rule 52H>). (FNft|
Because the pre-existing
background of Rule I \ was that Rule 52(b) did not
apply, and because the *1057 amendment adding
Huh: ?U:\) via subsection (h) did not also add Rule
?iii>i> the straightforward conclusion is that plainerror review does not apply to Rule 11 errors.
L^L R*JNV 52(b) states: "Plain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to
the attention of the court." When a court

reviews for plain error, the burden is on the
defendant to show that the error affected his
substantial rights. {jjjJ^LJS/ilIi:^x- (l:^:l:<.
?i!.li:.A- —*;: T ^ " 7 ^ J i i . . : M . J * * ' *^ '•-••*

EM.* BiikJy^iiii states: "Harmless error.
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall
be disregarded."
B*lk VJJll states:
"Harmless error. Any variance from the
procedures required by this rule which does
not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded."
LM(J. The Court incorrectly asserts that this
is an argument for repeal by implication of
Ruk 52ih?. Ante, at 1050 ("To hold that the
terms of Rule 11(h) imply that the latter half
°f K.M.Je $2 has no application to R u i i J l
errors would consequently amount to of
finding a partial repeal of R|*Ul..5Ji!>j by
implication,
a
result
sufficiently
disfavored").
This ignores the fact that
prior to the enactment of Rule I hit), courts
applied neither Rule 52(a) nor (b) to Rujc
11 violations.

Congress' decision to apply only Rule 52j;u's
harmless-error standard to Rule 11 errors is tailored
to the purpose of the Rule. The very premise of the
required Rule 11 colloquy is that, even if counsel is
present, the defendant may not adequately understand
the rights set forth in the Rule unless the judge
explains them.
It is thus perverse to place the
burden on the uninformed defendant to object to
deviations from RjyjiHM or to establish prejudice
arising out of the judge's failure to mention a right
that he does not know he has.J_FY7j[ Under the
Court's approach, the Government bears the burden
of establishing no harm only when the defendant
objects to the district court's failure to inform him.
In other words, the Government must show prejudice
only when the defendant asks the judge to advise him
of a right of which the RuleJ± colloquy assumes he
is unaware.
To see the implausibility of this,
imagine what such an objection would sound like:
"Your Honor, I object to your failure to inform me of
my right to assistance of counsel if I proceed to trial."
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; \ : The Court states that this is like any
other application of the plain-error rule as it
is applied to all trial errors. Ante, at 1054
("The plain-error rule, [Vonn] says, would
discount the judge's duty to advise the
defendant by obliging the defendant to
advise the judge. But, rhetoric aside, that is
always the point of the plain-error rule ...").
Unlike most rules that apply to a trial,
however, the special purpose of the K \}k_±j.
colloquy is to provide information to a
defendant prior to accepting his plea.
Given this purpose, it is inconceivable that
Congress intended the same rules for review
of noncompliance to apply.
A parallel
example from the self-representation context
illustrates this point. Pursuant to Farina w
CatyhniM. 422 iJ.S. 80c»rj>5 S.( t. 2S25, 45
L„LlLllL_5.(!l^i2Ji!» a defendant who
wishes to represent himself must "be made
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
se 1 f-representation," uF jit..835, *>5 .frX-V,,
.2525. Assume a defendant states that he
wishes to proceed pro se, and the trial judge
makes no attempt to warn the defendant of
the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation. If the defendant makes no
objection to the trial court's failure to warn,
surely we would not impose a plain-error
review standard upon this nonobjecting
defendant.
This is so because the
assumption
of
Fareifa's
warning
requirement is that the defendant is unaware
of the dangers. It is illogical in this context,
as m tne
Rate * * context, to require the
presumptively unknowing defendant to
object to the court's failure to adequately
inform.
Congress' decision to apply the
harmless-error standard to all Ruh 11 errors
surely reflects this logic.

Despite this implausible scenario, and to support the
result that it reaches, the Court's analysis relies upon
an image of a cunning defendant, who is fully
knowledgeable of his rights, and who games the
system by sitting silently as the district court,
apparently less knowledgeable than the defendant,
slips up in following the dictates of Huk^IJ. See,
e.g., ante, at 1048 ("[A] defendant loses nothing by

failing to object to obvious £tliilJLi error when it
occurs"); ante, at 1054 ("[A] defendant could choose
to say nothing about a judge's plain lapse under K<;v
! j until the moment of taking a direct appeal, at
which time the burden would always fall on the
Government to prove harmlessness. A defendant
could simply relax and wait to see if the sentence
later struck him as satisfactory"). My analysis is
based on a fundamentally different understanding of
the considerations that motivated the Kjjjc Li
colloquy requirements in the first place. Namely, in
light of the gravity of a plea, the court will assume no
knowledge on the part of the defendant, even if
represented by counsel, and the court must inform
him of a base level of information before accepting
his plea.JHVH

£N8. See Kevthwul
l niivd Shift.'
r.s. i2
JL4? S.O. 582. 71 L.fcd.
(1^2?) ("A plea of guilty differs in purpose
and effect from a mere admission or an extrajudicial confession;
it is itself a
conviction.... Out of just consideration for
persons accused of crime, courts are careful
that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted
unless made voluntarily after proper advice
and with full understanding of the
consequences").

*1058 The express inclusion in g.ul£.._..!.i of a
counterpart to Rule 52(a) and the omission of a
counterpart to Rule 52(h) is best understood as a
reflection of the fact that it is only fair to place the
burden of proving the impact of the judge's error on
the party who is aware of it rather than the party who
is unaware of it.
This burden allocation gives
incentive to the judge to follow meticulously the
Hyil.II requirements and to the prosecutor to correct
Rule 1 j errors at the time of the colloquy. The
Court's approach undermines those incentives.
I would remand to the Court of Appeals to determine
whether, taking account of the entire record, the
Government has met its burden of establishing that
the District Court's failure to inform the respondent
of his right to counsel at trial was harmless.

Hrlvh \uu\ Other Rdafcd Hon*menh iiuici*
I op}
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